Moral decision-making and moral development: Toward an integrative framework by Garrigan, Beverley et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Developmental Review
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/dr
Moral decision-making and moral development: Toward an
integrative framework
Beverley Garrigana, Anna L.R. Adlamb, Peter E. Langdonc,⁎
aDepartment of Clinical Psychology, Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia, UK
b School of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences. University of Exeter, UK
c Broadland Clinic, Hertfordshire Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust – Norfolk, UK







A B S T R A C T
How moral decision-making occurs, matures over time and relates to behaviour is complex. To
develop a full picture of moral decision-making, moral development and moral behaviour it is
necessary to understand: (a) how real-time moral decisions are made (including relevant social
and contextual factors), (b) what processes are required to develop to enable mature moral de-
cisions, (c) how these processes develop over time, and (d) how moral decisions relate to be-
haviour. In this paper, psychological and social neuroscience theories of moral decision-making
and development are brieﬂy reviewed, as is the development of relevant component processes.
Various component processes and factors are seen as required for moral decision-making and
development, yet there is no comprehensive framework incorporating these components into one
explanation of how real-time moral decisions are made and mature. In this paper, we integrated
these components into a new framework based on social information processing (SIP) theory.
Situational factors, and how both cognitive and aﬀective processes guide moral decisions was
incorporated into the Social Information Processing-Moral Decision-Making (SIP-MDM) frame-
work, drawing upon theories and ﬁndings from developmental psychology and social neu-
roscience. How this framework goes beyond previous SIP models was outlined, followed by a
discussion of how it can explain both real-time moral decisions and moral development. We
concluded with how the SIP-MDM framework could be used to guide future research and theory
development in this area.
Introduction
Diﬀerences in research approaches to moral decision-making and moral development, informed by various theories and per-
spectives have led to a discrepancy in the deﬁnitions and usage of moral terms, which can cause confusion. The terms ‘moral
judgement’, ‘moral reasoning’, and ‘moral cognition’ are often used interchangeably, and with diﬀering deﬁnitions. The broader term
moral decision-making will be used in this paper, to refer to any decision, including judgements, evaluations, and response choices,
made within the ‘moral domain’ (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983), i.e. decisions regarding moral issues or principles such as justice,
harm, fairness and care. A moral decision can be a response decision about how to behave in a real or hypothetical moral dilemma (a
situation with moral rules or principles attached, where a response choice is required), or it can be a judgement or evaluation about
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the moral acceptability of the actions, or moral character of others, including judgements of individuals, groups or institutions.
“Judgments and decisions of any sort – including those that involve matters of morality – are not a matter of magic but result from
processing of information” (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2015, p. 139). Moral decision-making, similarly to other types of decision-making, is
a complex process. When deciding how to act in a situation within the moral domain an individual must ﬁrstly recognise the situation
as having moral rules attached, retrieve relevant moral schemas from memory, encode and interpret relevant features of the situation
and generate and evaluate possible moral response options. As many processes are involved when making moral decisions, parti-
cularly moral response decisions, it follows that in order for moral decision-making to mature, many processes, and relationships
between processes, are required to develop. For example, to encode the relevant features of a moral situation, attention must be
allocated to these features. Increases in attentional abilities will lead to more features of a situation being encoded, and therefore
enhance the capacity for making more mature moral decisions. However, many other processes are also involved in moral decision-
making and each is necessary but not suﬃcient for mature moral decision-making. Moral development is the maturation of moral
decision-making, including the development of moral reasoning and related processes that increase the capacity for making mature
moral decisions. Moral reasoning diﬀers from other forms of reasoning because it is guided by morally relevant rules, knowledge and
understanding, stored in memory as moral schemas. Moral reasoning is one process that can guide moral decisions, but other
processes and factors are also involved, and the extent of their involvement can diﬀer depending on the type of decision being made.
The moral domain covers the fairly universal principles of harm, justice, fairness and care, though how these principles are set out
as rules or laws can diﬀer between societies, cultures and religions, and may change over time. It does not necessarily follow that
mature moral decisions based on a deep understanding and appreciation of moral principles will lead to behaviour that conforms to a
law of society. For example, an individual with a mature understanding of the moral principle of fairness may feel they cannot obey
laws that violate the human rights of a certain group. Furthermore, whether a moral response decision leads to enactment of a chosen
behaviour may depend on other contextual and situational factors. Behaviour which conforms to or follows moral principles (though
not necessarily laws) of society can be referred to as moral or prosocial behaviour, and behaviour which violates a moral principle of
society can be referred to as immoral or antisocial behaviour. Moral decision-making and how it develops will be the focus of this
paper, rather than moral behaviour, but we do oﬀer some suggestions for how future research could enhance our understanding of
the relationship between moral decisions and behaviour.
As outlined, moral decision-making, moral development and relationships between moral decision-making and behaviour is
complex. Previous theories have failed to comprehensively explain how real-time moral decisions are made, how they mature over
time and how they relate to behaviour. Moral theories within developmental psychology have focused on the maturity of moral
reasoning, as a process that guides moral decision-making. Such theories explain how moral reasoning develops and matures, for
example through increased role-taking opportunities leading to improvements in perspective taking and a move away from ego-
centrism (Piaget, 1932). However, these developmental theories have often neglected factors that aﬀect real-time moral decision-
making, such as relevant situational factors, and moral reasoning “levels” do not always correlate with behaviour (Blasi, 1983). Some
moral psychology theories have focused on real-time moral decision-making, such as the social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 2001)
which proposed that moral decisions are driven by automatic intuitions, yet these theories do not suggest how moral decision-making
matures or changes over time.
In recent years there has been an increased interest in moral decision-making amongst social neuroscientists (Beauchamp, Dooley,
& Anderson, 2013; Dooley, Beauchamp, & Anderson, 2010; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Mendez,
Anderson, & Shapira, 2005). The most prominent moral theory in social neuroscience is the dual-process theory, which makes
inferences about the cognitive and aﬀective processes involved in moral decision-making based on the extent to which diﬀerent brain
regions are activated when making such decisions (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell,
Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene et al., 2001). Some social neuroscience perspectives are more developmental in focus, suggesting how
brain development facilitates moral development through its eﬀect on the emergence of relevant cognitive and aﬀective processes,
but such theories do not always reference the rich tradition of developmental psychology theory in this area (Baird, 2008; Kagan,
2008). Taken together, moral theories from developmental psychology and social neuroscience have the potential to provide a fuller
picture of moral decision-making and moral development.
Moral theorists have proposed many diﬀerent component processes and factors required for moral decision-making and moral
development, such as perspective taking, intuitions and empathy. These components have not yet been integrated into one com-
prehensive theory which explains how real-time moral decisions are made and how they mature over time. In a review of the
neuroscience of moral cognition, Van Bavel, FeldmanHall, and Mende-Siedlecki (2015) advocated a shift from dual-process theories
to a dynamic systems model of moral cognition. For a dynamic explanation of moral decision-making and moral development it is
necessary to understand (a) how real-time moral decisions are made (including relevant social and contextual factors), (b) what
processes are required to develop to enable mature moral decisions, and (c) how these processes develop over time. To also explain
moral behaviour, it is necessary to understand how moral decisions relate to behaviour. Further research and theory development is
needed to answer these questions and provide a predictive model of moral decision-making and eventually moral behaviour. An
integrative framework incorporating aspects from developmental psychology and social neuroscience could be a ﬁrst step towards
such a model, in order to guide future research and theory development in this area. Social information processing theory (SIP) has
previously been integrated with moral domain theory (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004) but this integration could be expanded on to
include components from other moral theories while increasingly focusing on development.
In this paper, the main moral theories and perspectives will be brieﬂy reviewed, followed by a summary of their respective
strengths and weaknesses. We will explain why an integrated theory is needed and introduce SIP theory as an approach that can be
useful for such a framework. The component processes and factors suggested as being relevant for moral decision-making and
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development will be outlined, and selected research into how the main component processes develop will be discussed. These
components will then be incorporated into an integrative framework based on SIP theory. How this framework diﬀers from previous
SIP models and how it can explain moral decision-making and moral development will then be outlined, followed by suggestions for
how the framework could be used to guide future research and theory development in this area.
A brief review of moral theories and perspectives
Cognitive-developmental and aﬀective development theories
Historically, moral psychology has been dominated by the rationalist, cognitive-developmental theoretical perspective, em-
ploying stage theories to explain development. Piaget’s (1932) theory, often considered to be the ﬁrst cognitive-developmental theory
of moral development, outlined four stages of logical reasoning and two stages of moral development: heteronomy and autonomy.
Children in the heteronomous stage feel an obligation to abide by the external rules set by adults and when they reach the auton-
omous stage they realise that rules are worthy of respect and are based on mutual consent (Piaget, 1932). Piaget (1932) proposed that
logical reasoning develops alongside related cognitive processes such as abstract reasoning, and this paves the way for moral de-
velopment. At stage four, logical reasoning is deﬁned by the ability to use complex, abstract cognitive skills to solve problems, in turn
facilitating more mature moral decisions. Piaget (1932) hypothesised that moral development occurs as a child moves away from
egocentrism, which requires the cognitive capacity to diﬀerentiate between the ego and social environment, and is facilitated by the
maturation of language and imagination. From the age of about six or seven, a child’s opportunities for peer co-operation facilitates
the development of mutual respect, and so the child moves away from egocentric thought (Duska & Whelan, 1977). Piaget (1932)
proposed that children construct their social and moral intelligence through managing their social interactions, and he emphasised
peer over parent interactions.
Kohlberg (1976, 1981, 1984a) expanded Piaget’s theory beyond childhood, to encompass adolescence and adulthood, and argued
that, “since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning. There is a
parallel between an individual’s logical stage and his or her moral stage” (Kohlberg, 1984b, p. 171). Kohlberg (1976, 1981) proposed
six stages of moral judgement, grouped into three levels: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional. The pre-conventional
level is the level of most children under nine, while most adolescents and adults are at the conventional stage, and the post-con-
ventional level is reached by a minority of adults. Similarly to Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1976, 1981) emphasised the importance of
role-taking (taking another’s perspective) in moral development and proposed that a child’s social environment provides role-taking
opportunities and such participation in role-taking spurs on moral development. Kohlberg saw his six stages as sequential, one must
pass through each in turn. Development to the next stage occurs when cognitive disequilibrium is created, or when a person’s
perspective is not suﬃcient to deal with a moral dilemma. This disequilibrium causes a person to think about the inadequacies of
their reasoning and to search for more adequate reasons (Duska & Whelan, 1977). There have been some notable criticisms of
Kohlberg’s theory; some have commented that his theory is masculine in perspective (Gilligan, 1982), and there is evidence to doubt
whether the higher developmental stages are culturally universal (Snarey, 1985).
Rest, Bebeau, and Thoma’s (1999) componential model of moral development is often referred to as a neo-Kohlbergian approach,
moving the ﬁeld away from stage theory, and instead of seeing development as occurring one stage at a time, development was
considered gradual, leading to more mature forms of thinking. Rest (1984), proposed that the four components underlying moral
action are moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation and moral character. Moral sensitivity involved interpreting the
situation and an awareness of the relevant moral factors and implications, including how actions would aﬀect others, which requires
perspective taking. The moral judgement component involved deliberation over possible courses of action and deciding which would
be most morally justiﬁable. The moral motivation component involved prioritising moral values over other competing values, and
moral character referred to skills and strategies that support the moral choice, such as self-control (Rest, 1984; Walker, 2002). This
model integrated both cognitive and aﬀective processes and also highlighted that moral action (behaviour), not just moral judge-
ments, required explanation. Rest et al. (1999) also recognised the usefulness of schema theory to moral development, which was
further developed by Gibbs (2013).
Cognitive-developmental theorists proposed that cognition, and particularly reasoning, is the main driver of moral decisions.
Hoﬀman’s theory (2000), on the other hand, is one of aﬀective primacy, and focused on aﬀective empathy as the main driver of moral
decisions, rather than cognition, though he did highlight the role of cognition for development and for achieving a “self-other”
distinction. He proposed that empathy is congruent with the moral principles of caring and justice, playing an important role in moral
decision-making and reasoning. Hoﬀman’s (2000) developmental framework of empathy involved three primitive modes: mimicry,
conditioning and direct association, and two mature modes: verbally mediated association and social perspective taking, with lan-
guage and cognitive development facilitating the development of the mature modes. He proposed that aﬀective empathy, construed
as aﬀect rather than cognition, becomes bonded with moral principles, giving the principles motive force, while empathy could act as
a powerful retrieval cue, triggering moral schemas stored in memory. Hoﬀman (2000) also linked cognition with emotion, as he
hypothesised that the attributions people make about the cause of events can aﬀect the level of empathy experienced; empathic
distress may be neutralised if a victim is viewed as being responsible for their own plight. He hypothesised that a person’s moral
structure, made up of empathic aﬀects, cognitive representations and motives is internalised when they accept and abide by its
principles without regard to external reward or punishment.
Gibbs (2013) oﬀered an alternative to aﬀective or cognitive primacy theories, and argued that the most plausible position within
developmental theory is that moral motivation occurs as a consequence of aﬀective and cognitive coprimacy; that is, both aﬀect and
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cognition act as motives for moral action. While Kohlberg proposed six stages, Gibbs, Basinger, and Fuller (1992) and Gibbs (2013)
proposed four stages, grouped into immature and mature levels, and added more transitional stages. Gibbs (2013) argued that the
standard stages of moral development reﬂect gains in working memory, and hypothesised that attentional abilities are required to
develop for the maturation of moral decisions. Increasing attentional abilities allow individuals to attend to more than one feature of
a situation, moving away from an egocentric bias, and gains in working memory capacity allow for more than one source of in-
formation to be held in mind when making decisions (Gibbs, 2013).
Gibbs (2013) also hypothesised other factors relevant to explaining moral behaviour; he proposed that antisocial behaviour can be
explained as a function of a developmental delay in moral judgement, self-serving cognitive distortions (e.g. self-centred, blaming
others and minimising biases) and deﬁciencies in social skills. Gibbs (2013) proposed that the mature stages of moral development
are constructed through social perspective taking. He developed Rest et al.’s (1999) proposition that moral stages should be con-
ceptualised as schemas, proposing that adaptive reﬁnement and reorganisation of schemas enables moral development to take place.
Schemas are “general knowledge structures that reside in long-term memory and facilitate information processing” (Walker, 2002, p.
361), with moral schemas being knowledge structures regarding moral events. However, moral decisions do not just mature because
they are based on an increased quality and quantity of empirical knowledge; schemas are frameworks, and moral maturity, or
“growing beyond the superﬁcial” requires a deeper understanding of fairness and moral reciprocity (Gibbs, 2013).
While Rest et al. (1999) and Gibbs (2013) revised Kohlberg’s theory (Kohlberg, 1976, 1981, 1984a, 1984b), retaining the cog-
nitive-developmental perspective, others have criticised Kohlberg’s theory and called for a new approach, due to the lack of cor-
relation between moral maturity and behaviour (Krebs & Denton, 2005). It has been argued that the study of morality has been
dominated by investigating moral decisions as an end product, whereas in real life, behaviour is the end product (Krebs and Denton,
2005), and moral reasoning does not fully explain behaviour (Blasi, 1983). Rest (1984), Rest et al. (1999) and Gibbs (2013) has been
crucial for advancing the moral development ﬁeld towards a co-primacy approach and in conceptualising moral stages as schemas.
Both theories focus on moral action as the end point, and go some way to explaining moral motivations and the moral decision-
making processes that occur when weighing up diﬀerent courses of action. These theories could be expanded by also taking into
account other, non-moral factors, such as situational factors, that might aﬀect the process from moral decisions to behaviour. Rather
than rejecting cognitive-developmental perspectives, an integrative approach incorporating aspects from cognitive-developmental
theories with additional aspects from other relevant theories may lead to a theory which predicts moral behaviour more robustly.
Social intuitionist theory and the somatic marker hypothesis
Through their focus on the development of logical reasoning development, early moral development theorists proposed that
moral decisions are driven by reasoning, within the cognitive domain. On the other hand, within social intuitionist theory, Haidt
(2001) proposed that moral decisions are driven by emotionally-based intuitions, and that moral reasoning is constructed after a
decision, to explain a decision that had been made intuitively. Haidt and Bjorklund (2008) argued that moral beliefs and motivations
come from a small set of intuitions that have evolved. Support for the theory comes from studies which show ‘moral dumbfounding’;
people give quick answers to moral dilemmas but then struggle to explain their answers (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). The real diﬀerence
between rationalist and intuitionist theories is one of emphasis; while rationalists believe that the real action is reasoning, intui-
tionists believe that the real action is “gut feeling”, moral emotions and quick intuition (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008).
The social intuitionist view of intuitions driving moral decisions is not entirely dissimilar to Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker
hypothesis, although there are diﬀerences with reference to the role of reasoning. Somatic markers are another intuitive, automatic
process which may guide some moral decisions. The somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1994) re-
cognised the role of emotions in decision-making and proposed that when we think of a bad outcome connected with a given response
option that comes to mind, we experience an unpleasant gut feeling, which is a ‘somatic marker’. This somatic marker then forces our
attention onto the negative outcome and may lead to rejection of this option. Somatic markers can be stored in memory as aﬀect-
event links, which further aid future decision-making (Damasio, 1994) as they can guide decision-making by anticipating future
events, even when not consciously recognised (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). While somatic markers can operate without coming to
consciousness, when they are conscious they can help to narrow down the number of response options and this process occurs before
reasoning, increasing the accuracy and eﬃciency of the decision process (Damasio, 1994). This is in contrast to the social intuitionist
view that reasoning is not involved in the decision-making process but is only carried out to explain a decision already made.
Haidt (2001) argued that the important distinction between intuition and reasoning is that intuition occurs quickly, eﬀortlessly
and automatically, while reasoning is slow and requires more eﬀort, including attentional resources. Kahneman (2011) uses the
metaphors of System 1 and System 2 to describe fast and slow thinking. System 1 is responsible for intuitive, automatic thinking and
operates with little or no eﬀort, while System 2 is responsible for more deliberate thought and reasoning and requires eﬀortful mental
activities. Kahneman (2011) argued that System 1 is responsible for more of the decisions we make than System 2, and his view seems
to mirror that of the social intuitionists: “If System 1 is involved the conclusion comes ﬁrst and the arguments follow” (p 45).
However, System 2 is needed to monitor and control thoughts and actions suggested by System 1, so deliberate thought and reasoning
are needed to conﬁrm, reject or reformulate the automatic suggestions, or intuitions of System 1.
Domain theory
Domain theory, referred to as social-cognitive domain theory or moral domain theory, views morality as one of several strands of
the developing social knowledge of children (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983). This theory makes the important distinction between the
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personal, moral, and social domains and it is proposed that these domains follow diﬀerent developmental trajectories, with
knowledge being constructed through reciprocal social interactions. The majority of research based on domain theory has focused on
establishing whether children of diﬀerent ages can distinguish between moral and social conventional acts (Killen & Smetana, 1999;
Smetana, 1985; Song, Smetana & Kim, 1987; Tisak & Turiel, 1988). Hypothetical situations used in studies are either in the personal,
moral or social domain, yet real-life situations often involve more than one domain. Nucci (2001) argued that in mixed-domain
situations there are individual diﬀerences in whether the situation is interpreted as being in the social or moral domain.
While domain research has been helpful in highlighting the distinction between domains, the predictions made about how moral
decisions develop and mature with age require greater theoretical elaboration. In summarising domain-related research, Smetana
(2006) argued that studies with children of diﬀerent ages conﬁrm understanding within the moral domain develops from a focus on
concrete harm in early childhood to an understanding of fairness in later childhood. This is similar to how cognitive-developmental
theorists propose that moral reasoning maturity occurs, with the development of an appreciation of fairness and equality, but domain
theory does not elaborate on the cognitive or aﬀective processes that allow for this development to occur. A review of domain theory
concluded that it should be seen as a complementary rather than alternative to existing accounts of moral development because of its
conceptual and methodological ﬂaws (Lourenço, 2014).
Social neuroscience theories and perspectives
There has been an increased interest in moral decision-making amongst social neuroscientists. Some social neuroscience theories
of moral decision-making and development have been proposed, but these do not always reference the rich tradition within de-
velopmental psychology. The dominant theory within social neuroscience has been the dual-process theory (Greene et al., 2008,
2004, 2001). In this theory it is proposed that people make moral decisions based either on negative emotional responses elicited by a
dilemma, or by engaging in utilitarian moral reasoning. Initial emotional responses can be overridden by moral reasoning but this
requires increased cognitive control. Support for this theory comes from studies showing increased activity in the medial prefrontal
cortex (emotional responses), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (cognitive reasoning) and the anterior cingulate cortex (signals the need
for cognitive control) when choosing responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas (Greene, 2009). This theoretical perspective focuses
only on explaining utilitarian moral decision-making (i.e. approving harmful actions that maximise good consequences) and while
this theory can help in understanding how utilitarian moral decisions are made, it tells us little about how moral maturity occurs.
Other social-neuroscience perspectives have been proposed which are more developmental in focus than the dual-process ac-
count. Kagan (2008) presented a developmental theory of morality, drawing on both cognitive-developmental stages and neu-
roscience, with the inclusion of aﬀective components such as guilt and empathy. He proposed that children follow a universal
sequence of stages and each stage involves the emergence of a new cognitive achievement, due to corresponding changes in brain
circuitry. Kagan’s ﬁfth stage, occurring between ages 5 and 10 years is an understanding of abstract constructs such as fairness and
ideals, which is facilitated by profound maturational changes in the brain between ages 5 and 7 years. Similar to Kagan (2008), Baird
(2008) linked moral development to brain development within her theory, although she particularly focused on brain development in
adolescence and argued that the maturation of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) produces signiﬁcant improvements in behavioural and
emotional control, decision-making and abstract reasoning. Baird (2008) also focused on the integration of emotion and cognition in
adolescence, and argued that we have an innate capacity to develop a moral sense. She incorporated ideas from the somatic marker
hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) to explain how emotional states can guide future decisions, by proposing that developmental im-
provements in cognition lead to the development of self-conscious emotions.
Taber-Thomas and Tranel (2012) presented a cognitive neuroscience perspective of social and moral functioning, and argued that
there is a functional hierarchy underlying socio-moral functioning, from basic functions such as processing emotion from faces, to
higher cognitive processes such as moral cognition. They concluded that social and moral functioning critically depend on a core
fronto-limbic network centred on the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), but acknowledged that this network does not function in isolation
and relies on other social functions. As with Baird’s theory (2008), their perspective incorporated aspects of the somatic marker
hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) and they asserted that the vmPFC is crucial for the anticipation of emotional consequences of behaviour.
There are other social neuroscience theories, which while not speciﬁcally moral theories, are of relevance here, as they in-
corporated moral reasoning and some of the relevant component processes and factors. Anderson and Beauchamp (2012) presented
the Socio-Cognitive Integration of Abilities Model (SOCIAL), a theoretical framework of social function, which deﬁned social
function/skills as social competence, social interaction and social adjustment. Within the SOCIAL framework it is posited that the
emergence of social function is shaped by internal factors (e.g. temperament and personality), external factors (e.g. family en-
vironment, socioeconomic status (SES) and culture) and brain development and integrity. Brain development and integrity has not
yet been explicitly included in any models of moral development. The SOCIAL framework also included higher-order cognitive
processes critical for social functioning: attention, executive skills (including attentional control, cognitive ﬂexibility and goal set-
ting), communication and social cognition (including emotion perception, attribution, Theory of Mind (ToM) and moral reasoning)
(Anderson & Beauchamp, 2012). While this framework included moral reasoning as a sub-skill of social cognition, this relationship
could be reframed to explain how social cognition may impact upon moral reasoning maturity.
Yeates et al. (2012) suggested an integrative model of social competence in children with brain disorders, including three main
components: SIP, social interaction and social adjustment. The authors deﬁned SIP as a series of problem-solving steps, and they
referenced the importance of executive functions and ToM to SIP. The three components of the model can impact upon and interact
with each other, and factors that can aﬀect the development of these components are parenting style, family function and SES, as well
as brain injury related factors such as type and severity of insult and regional brain abnormalities (Yeates et al., 2012). While this is a
theory of social competence rather than moral development, social competence can inﬂuence interactions with peers, which can in
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turn impact upon the development of perspective taking, which is proposed to be crucial for moral development (Gibbs, 2013;
Hoﬀman, 2000; Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1932). Components from these social perspectives could be incorporated into a framework of
moral development in an attempt to explain how social functioning may aﬀect social interactions, moral decisions and moral be-
haviour.
Summary of moral theories and perspectives
The theories and perspectives outlined above diﬀer in their focus. Moral theories within developmental psychology focus on the
maturity of moral reasoning, as a process that guides moral decision-making. These theories explain how moral reasoning develops
and matures, through processes such as increased role-taking opportunities leading to improvements in perspective taking and a
move away from egocentrism. Cognitive-developmental theories focus on the role of reasoning maturity in moral decision-making
while Hoﬀman (2000) focused on the role of aﬀective empathy development (Hoﬀman, 2000) and Gibbs (2013) suggested a co-
primacy approach. Social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 2001) focused on automatic intuitions as a driver for moral decisions but does
not propose how moral decision-making matures over time. Similarly, dual-process theory (Greene et al., 2008, 2004, 2001) focused
on real-time moral decision-making rather than development of moral maturity, and inferences about which cognitive and aﬀective
processes are involved are made based on the extent to which diﬀerent brain regions are activated. Other social neuroscience
approaches are more developmental in focus (Baird, 2008; Kagan, 2008) and focused on how brain development correlates with
moral development, through its eﬀect on the emergence of relevant cognitive and aﬀective processes, such as abstract reasoning and
emotion recognition.
Diﬀerences in focus within these moral theories have led to diﬀerent research priorities. Within developmental psychology, there
is a tradition of trying to measure developmental stages of moral reasoning, with a lack of focus on other factors, such as situational
factors, which may inﬂuence moral decisions and behaviour. Social neuroscience research tends to use either neuroimaging methods
while individuals are making moral-decisions, as a measure of which brain regions and related processes are involved, or, measures
moral decision-making in individuals with brain injuries. Social neuroscience research typically focuses on the real-time moral
decision-making process, without focusing on development, while developmental psychology research focuses on moral maturity
rather than other processes involved in decision-making, with neither research discipline focusing on moral behaviour as the end
product.
There are strengths and weaknesses of the various theories discussed in this paper. Piaget’s (1932) theory was the ﬁrst cognitive-
developmental theory and highlighted the role of logical reasoning for moral development. While Piaget proposed how moral de-
velopment can occur (though social interactions), his theory focused only on development in children. Kohlberg (1976, 1981, 1984a)
extended this theory beyond childhood, and also proposed how moral development occurs (through role-taking opportunities).
However, Kohlberg’s theory has been criticised as being masculine in focus and the stages may not be culturally universal. A further
weakness of Kohlberg’s theory is his proposition that stages are sequential and that higher stages of reasoning replace immature
stages; individuals are not consistent in their stage of reasoning in response to diﬀerent hypothetical dilemmas, suggesting that
immature stages can co-exist alongside mature stages (Krebs & Denton, 2005). In contrast to Kohlberg’s proposition that stages are
sequential, Rest et al. (1999) and Gibbs (2013) proposed that development is gradual and can be conceptualised as schemas. Moral
schemas, and the extent to which they are activated, may develop over time and be dependent upon situational factors. A further
strength of the work of Rest and Gibbs is in their focus on moral behaviour rather than just moral decisions, and they go some way to
explaining links between moral decisions and behaviour, though this could be expanded upon. Furthermore, Gibbs’s theory is one of
co-primacy, which brings together competing viewpoints in the ﬁeld by proposing that both cognition and aﬀect can act as motives
for moral action.
While social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 2001) can help to explain why some moral decisions appear automatic, the theory does not
focus on individual diﬀerences in the proposed set of evolved moral beliefs or motivations, or how they develop and lead to moral
maturity. Domain theory (Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983) has been helpful in highlighting the distinction between domains but does
not make strong predictions about how moral development occurs. One limitation of moral psychology theories is that they have not
explicitly included brain development, and how this can impact on moral development. Social neuroscience theories and perspectives
have attempted to link stages of development to corresponding brain circuitry, helping to explain how brain development relates to
moral development (Baird, 2008; Kagan, 2008). However, social neuroscience perspectives do not always reference the rich tradition
of developmental psychology theory in this area, such as Anderson and Beauchamp (2012) who cite Kohlberg (1984a) in explaining
the moral reasoning component of SOCIAL, without reference to criticisms of his theory, or more recent formulations, such as Gibbs
(2013).
Why is an integrative framework needed?
Taken together, moral theories from developmental psychology and social neuroscience provide a fuller picture of the processes
and factors relevant for moral decision-making, and how these might develop to enable moral maturity. The diﬀerent components
proposed to be required for moral decision-making and development have not yet been integrated into one comprehensive theory. An
integrative framework could include both aﬀective and cognitive processes and also show how both intuitions and reasoning can
guide moral decisions. Developmental psychology theories have outlined that the cognitive and aﬀective processes required for
mature moral decision-making develop with age, but have not explicitly explained how this occurs as a consequence of brain de-
velopment. More recent neuroscience perspectives have emphasised the importance of brain development for the maturation of
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moral reasoning and related processes, but often neglect the moral developmental psychology literature. The ﬁeld of moral devel-
opment would beneﬁt from clearer integration of the developmental psychology literature with insights from social neuroscience
research.
In a review of the neuroscience of moral cognition, Van Bavel et al. (2015) argued that hypothetical scenarios used in neu-
roscience research usually ignore the inﬂuence of social and contextual factors, and they advocated a shift from dual-process theories
to a dynamic systems model of moral cognition. Most moral theories and the research focus on moral decisions (judgements, eva-
luations or response decisions) as the end point, rather than seeking to explain how these moral decisions relate to behaviour. Some
theories have sought to explain moral action, including the interpretation of a situation (Rest, 1984), cognitive distortions and social
skills (Gibbs, 2013) within theory, but additional factors may also be relevant. Further theory development is needed in order to
explore the inﬂuences on real-time moral decisions, how these decisions mature over time and how they relate to behaviour. An
integrative framework incorporating aspects from developmental psychology and social neuroscience could be a ﬁrst step, to guide
future research and theory development in this area.
Social information processing theory
SIP theory (Crick & Dodge, 1994) was proposed as an explanation of how decisions are made in relation to aggression. Aggression
is a behaviour which harms, or is intended to harm another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). The original SIP model therefore relates to
the moral principle of harm, and has the potential to be expanded to explain the processing involved in other decisions and beha-
viours within the moral domain (i.e. justice, fairness and care). SIP theory has previously been integrated with moral domain theory
(Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004) but such an integration can be greatly expanded upon, incorporating aspects from other moral theories.
According to SIP theory (Fig 1. Crick & Dodge, 1994), children’s behavioural responses are a function of the processing of
information in a situation. The model consists of six steps: (1) encoding of cues, (2) interpretation of cues, (3) clariﬁcation of goals,
(4) response access or construction, (5) response decision, and (6) behavioural enactment. The six steps represent a logical order but
do not necessarily occur in this order, and can co-occur. Children come to a social situation with a set of biologically determined
capabilities and a database of memories of past experiences, which can aﬀect how information is processed (Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Memories of past events are stored in the database as acquired rules, social schemas and social knowledge. SIP abilities are theorised
to develop with age due to a growth in experience with social interactions, developmental shifts in attentional ability, mental
capacity or speed of processing, and the organisation and interpretation of social information (Crick & Dodge, 1994). This is similar to
how moral development is proposed to occur, according to the various moral development theories, suggesting that moral devel-
opment could be explained using a SIP framework.
Emotional processes were incorporated into the SIP model by Lemerise and Arsenio (2000), suggesting that a SIP approach can be
used to address the cognition vs. aﬀect divide within moral psychology. They added emotional processes at certain steps of the SIP
model, such as emotion recognition at Step 1 and empathic responsiveness at Step 5. Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) also added aﬀect-
event links to the database in the centre of the model, and theorised that memories of past events include aﬀective as well as cognitive
components. This is similar to Hoﬀman’s (2000) proposal that aﬀective empathy can act as a powerful retrieval cue, triggering moral
schemas stored in memory, and also similar to Damasio’s (1994) proposal that somatic markers can be stored in memory as aﬀect-
event links, aiding future decision-making. In addition, Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) added emotional processes to the centre of the
Fig. 1. Crick and Dodge’s (1994) Social information processing model. Caption: From Crick, N.R., & Dodge, K.A. (1994). A review and reformulation
of social information-processing mechanisms in children’s social adjustment. Psychological bulletin, 115(1), 74. Fig. 2. “A reformulated social
information-processing model of children’s social adjustment”, p.76. Copyright 1994 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with
permission.
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SIP model and hypothesised that individual diﬀerences in emotionality and emotion regulation can inﬂuence each step of SIP. They
proposed that children enter a social situation with a level of physiological arousal or mood and diﬀer in their ability to regulate this,
partly due to biological predispositions of their emotionality or temperament.
Following their integration of emotional processes into the SIP model, Arsenio and Lemerise (2004) incorporated SIP with moral
domain theory, proposing that moral domain theory can be used to expand on the latent mental structures, or the database of the
model. They hypothesised that social experiences lead to the generation of latent mental structures that are stored in memory, or the
database. Domain knowledge stored in memory must be activated and used in the processing of a situation in order to inﬂuence
behaviour. If domain knowledge is retrieved early in the process, it can inﬂuence other steps of SIP, such as goal clariﬁcation (Arsenio
& Lemerise, 2004). Social schemas are in the centre of the SIP model, as a component that can inﬂuence all steps of processing.
Calvete and Orue (2012) found that adolescents who scored higher on a justiﬁcation for violence schema were more likely to choose
an aggressive behaviour in response to a hypothetical ambiguous situation, and a narcissism schema predicted anger and access to
aggressive responses. This study also found that aggressive response access predicted aggression, and so response access may play a
mediating role between schemas and behaviour (Calvete & Orue, 2012). Moral schemas will be relevant for moral decision-making,
but how they relate to moral behaviour, including any potential mediating factors or processes, remains to be explored. The in-
tegration of domain theory with SIP theory added moral domain knowledge to the centre of the model, as a component that can aﬀect
all steps of processing. However, moral decision-making does not mature based solely on an increase of moral knowledge; it also
involves other processes, such as the development of perspective taking and a move away from egocentricity (Gibbs, 2013; Kohlberg,
1976, 1984a, 1984b; Piaget, 1932).
Aspects from other moral theories could be integrated into a SIP framework. Rest’s (1984) moral sensitivity component involves
interpretation of the situation, which is similar to Step 2 of the SIP model, and his proposed moral judgement component which
involves deliberation could be formulated as Step 5 of a SIP model. Palmer (2003) proposed a model of oﬀending behaviour which
incorporated both moral reasoning development and SIP skills, and she theorised that SIP mediates the link between parenting and
oﬀending (Palmer, 2000). Palmer (2003) proposed that developmental levels of moral reasoning can aﬀect SIP steps. At Steps 1 and
2, perspective taking and degree of egocentricity, both associated with moral reasoning level, are likely to inﬂuence an individual’s
ability to make accurate attributions about intent and causality (Palmer, 2003). She proposed that immature levels of moral rea-
soning will be associated with biases in processing, such as a hostile attribution bias. At Step 3, Palmer (2003) theorised that the types
of goals chosen are likely to be associated with level of perspective taking and egocentricity, and increasing maturity of moral
reasoning will be associated with goals that take the feelings and needs of other people and wider society into account. At Steps 4 and
5, moral reasoning maturity will impact on response generation; diﬀerent responses will be justiﬁable depending on moral reasoning
maturity, with individuals reasoning at a higher level less likely to perceive physical aggression as justiﬁable, based on moral
concerns for the feelings of others (Palmer, 2003). Components from various moral theories could be added to a SIP framework to
show how moral maturity can aﬀect each step of processing and how engaging in SIP can aﬀect moral maturity.
The components of moral decision-making and development: what develops and how?
What develops?
“Central to any discussion of developmental issues is the consideration of ‘what develops’” (Crick & Dodge, 1994, p. 80). Table 1
displays the main component processes and factors suggested by various theories and perspectives to be involved in real-time moral
decision-making or necessary for moral development. These components are grouped into broad categories of cognitive, aﬀective,
social and other. Some of the aﬀective components listed could be viewed as either cognitive or aﬀective (e.g. emotion regulation)
but within this paper we have considered they are by and large aﬀective. Some components such as perspective taking and empathy
are proximal factors of moral development, while other components are more distal factors. For example, social skills, while distal
factors, still aﬀect the development of components such as moral schemas and perspective taking by facilitating opportunities for
social perspective taking, which in turn facilitates moral development. There are many bi-directional relationships between com-
ponents; for example, peer interaction inﬂuences the development of perspective taking abilities, which in turn can aﬀect peer
interactions. Some research has found developmental and predictive relationships between components, (e.g. Vera-Estay, Seni,
Champagne, & Beauchamp, 2016), suggesting that the various components could be integrated into one framework of moral de-
velopment.
Development of moral decision-making and related components
We have highlighted the component processes and factors that have been suggested as important for real-time moral decision-
making and moral development. In order for these components to be integrated into a framework which describes how moral
decision-making occurs and matures over time, it is necessary to understand how these components develop, and how their de-
velopmental trajectories may impact on real-time moral decision-making. We will now review selected research into how the main
components develop, before integrating the components into a developmental framework.
Moral decision-making
Most research into moral decision-making has focused on moral evaluations or response choices in adults, but there is some
research into the development of moral preferences in children and adolescents. Evidence of an understanding of moral rules, as well
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as showing moral preferences and expectations have been found to be present in children as young as three months, shown by their
preference to attend to a prosocial character (Kiley Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010). When asked to judge the actions of others, young
children weigh up the costs and beneﬁts of harm, as older children and adults do, but children aged 6 years old judge decisions
involving harm negatively, regardless of whether it leads to a greater beneﬁt (Powell, Derbyshire, & Guttentag, 2012), suggesting that
young children are inﬂuenced by outcome when making moral evaluations. Cognitive-developmental theorists proposed that taking
situational circumstances, including an actor’s intentions into account when reasoning about moral issues only occurs at the mature
level, transition stage 3/4 according to Gibbs et al. (1992). In contrast to this proposal, research has found that even young children
are able to take intentions into account when making moral judgements. Although inﬂuenced by outcome, young children, similarly
to adults, are also inﬂuenced by an actor’s intentions when making moral evaluations; the reliance on intent when making moral
decisions, and the ability to distinguish more clearly between ill and well-intentioned actions both develop with age (Cushman,
Sheketoﬀ, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Bartholomew, 2016; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009). It may be the
case that young children are able to take intent into account when their attention is oriented towards this feature of an event, as in the
studies mentioned above (e.g. “What did X want to do?” or “‘‘Did [the character] want [the relevant outcome to occur]?’’), but they
do not independently focus on intent until later ages, or at least do not articulate intent when explaining their reasoning. Moral
reasoning is often measured as an indicator of an individual’s highest capacity for reasoning across diﬀerent questions or moral
dilemmas and research has found that moral reasoning develops with age (Chiasson, Vera-Estay, Lalonde, Dooley, & Beauchamp,
2017; Colby et al., 1983; Gibbs et al., 1992; Humphries, Parker, & Jagers, 2000; Vera-Estay et al., 2016).
Social neuroscience studies can reveal which brain regions are more active during moral decision-making, or how damage to
certain brain regions aﬀects moral decision-making. Neuroimaging studies using moral decision-making tasks have found that the
brain region most commonly activated is the vmPFC (Fumagalli & Priori, 2012). The vmPFC is involved in emotional processing
(Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011) so its recruitment during moral decision-making oﬀers some support for the view that moral decisions
are driven by emotions. Neuroimaging studies into moral decision-making typically employ tasks which involve judging the actions
of others rather than making your own response decisions about how to act; the vmPFC has not been found to show increased
activation during moral response decision tasks, but further research employing such tasks is needed (Garrigan, Adlam, and Langdon,
2016a; Garrigan, Adlam, and Langdon, 2016).
The large majority of neuroimaging studies of moral decision-making involve adults and there is limited research into how the
maturation of relevant brain regions may correlate with mature moral decision-making. Harenski, Harenski, Shane, and Kiehl (2012)
did include 15 adolescents (aged 13–18 years) in their functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study alongside an adult sample
(aged 19–53 years) and found a positive correlation between age and hemodynamic activity in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ)
when participants rated the severity of moral transgressions. This region is known to contribute to mentalising during moral decision-
making in adults, so the authors concluded that adolescents use mentalising less than adults when rating moral transgressions. There
Table 1
The components of moral decision-making and development.
Component type Component Theories/perspectives to have proposed this component is involved in moral decision-making or
development
Cognitive Working memory Gibbs (2013)
Perspective taking Baird (2008), Piaget (1932), Gibbs (2013), Kohlberg (1976, 1984a, b), Rest (1984, 1999)
Attention Gibbs (2013), Crick and Dodge (1994)
Abstract thought/reasoning Baird (2008), Piaget (1932)
Logical reasoning Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1984a, b)
Schemas/scripts Gibbs (2013), Hoﬀman (2000), Rest et al. (1999), Crick and Dodge (1994), Arsenio and Lemerise
(2004), Lemerise and Arsenio (2000)
Attributions Hoﬀman (2000), Gibbs (2013), Crick and Dodge (1994), Arsenio and Lemerise (2004), Lemerise and
Arsenio (2000)
Self-control Rest (1984, 1999)
Aﬀective Aﬀective empathy Hoﬀman (2000), Kohlberg (1984a, b), Gibbs (2013)
Emotion regulation Lemerise and Arsenio (2000)
Emotion recognition Anderson and Beauchamp (2012), Taber-Thomas and Tranel (2012)




Anderson and Beauchamp (2012), Gibbs (2013), Yeates et al (2012)
Peer interaction/socialisation Piaget (1932), Gibbs (2013), Hoﬀman (2000), Haidt (2001), Turiel (1983), Smetana (2006), Yeates
et al (2012), Lemerise and Arsenio (2000)
Socio-economic status Anderson and Beauchamp (2012), Yeates et al (2012)
Culture Haidt (2001), Anderson and Beauchamp (2012)
Parenting/family function Piaget (1932), Hoﬀman (2000) Palmer (2003), Anderson and Beauchamp (2012), Yeates et al (2012)
Other Brain development and integrity Baird (2008), Kagan (2008), Taber-Thomas and Tranel (2012), Anderson and Beauchamp (2012),
Yeates et al (2012)
Temperament/personality Haidt (2001), Kagan (2008), Lemerise and Arsenio (2000)
Social information processing Arsenio and Lemerise (2004), Palmer (2000)
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were no signiﬁcant age diﬀerences for ratings of transgressions, indicating that adults and adolescents were similarly able to identify
violations and rate their severity. It may, therefore, be the case that adolescents use mentalising as much as adults when rating
transgressions, but that mentalising in adolescence activates other regions in the network; neuroimaging research of cognition has
found that children and adolescents activate networks more extensively, while adults show activation in more speciﬁc regions
(Scherf, Sweeney, & Luna, 2006; Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002).
Perspective taking
The component cited by most theories as being crucial for moral development is perspective taking. Perspective taking in this
context is considered to be the cognitive component of empathy and refers to the ability to infer another’s mental states and attri-
butions; also referred to as mentalisation ability or ToM. Perspective taking is important for moral development as it allows for the
thoughts and feelings of others to be taken into account when making moral decisions, as attributions of intent can aﬀect how moral
decisions are processed, and whether empathy is triggered. While perspective taking is the component most frequently proposed to be
involved in moral development, there is little research linking the development of perspective taking to moral decision-making.
Research has found that visual perspective taking (taking into account what others can see) develops between 12 and 14months
(Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007) and that by four years old children can pass false belief tasks (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001),
showing an understanding that a person can have a belief that contradicts reality. There is limited research into the development of
perspective taking in adolescence but it has been found that more complex perspective taking, such as the ability to take into account
another person’s perspective to direct appropriate behaviour, and the ability to understand another’s emotional states are still de-
veloping into late adolescence (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Vetter, Altgassen, Phillips, Mahy, & Kliegel, 2013). Studies
have found that males only show increases in perspective taking from 15 years onwards, suggesting gender diﬀerences in develop-
mental trajectories (Van der Graaﬀ et al., 2014).
Perspective taking is hypothesised to develop through social interaction and pretend play (Kohlberg, 1976, 1981; Piaget, 1932;
Selman, 1976). The importance of peer interaction for perspective taking development in adolescence has been emphasised over
parent interaction (Baird, 2008) and research has found that children’s competence in peer interaction is signiﬁcantly related to ToM
understanding (Peterson, Slaughter, Moore, & Wellman, 2016). As perspective taking develops through an interaction with the social
environment, social factors (e.g. SES) can inﬂuence its development, which in turn aﬀects moral development. A framework of moral
development, therefore, needs to include perspective taking, along with the processes aﬀected by perspective taking (e.g. aﬀective
empathy), and factors which inﬂuence the development of perspective taking (e.g. peer interaction).
“The brain regions that undergo the most signiﬁcant development during adolescence overlap with those that have been linked to
the ability to take other people’s perspectives and infer mental states.” (Choudhury, Blakemore, & Charman, 2006, p. 168). A study
into the development of the neural network associated with perspective taking found that in adults (aged 25–32 years), activity
increased in the left inferior parietal cortex and precuneus when processing third person, compared to ﬁrst person judgments, and
children (aged 8–10 years) additionally showed increased activity in the dorsolateral PFC and the right inferior parietal cortex
(Dosch, Loenneker, Bucher, Martin, & Klaver, 2010). There was also a decrease in reaction time diﬀerences between third and ﬁrst
person perspective judgements with age, suggesting that adults are more eﬃcient at processing third person perspectives (Dosch
et al., 2010). Sebastian et al. (2012) found an increased neural response in the vmPFC for adolescents compared to adults during an
aﬀective ToM task, but no signiﬁcant diﬀerence during a cognitive ToM task, and an increased amount of errors in the adolescent
group for the aﬀective but not the cognitive ToM condition. These ﬁndings suggest that the development of aﬀective ToM, under-
standing the emotional states of others, is more complex and continues beyond that that of cognitive ToM.
Attention and working memory
The cognitive processes of attention and working memory are proposed to be required for moral development (Gibbs, 2013).
Development of working memory can refer to both an increase in capacity, i.e. the amount of information that can be temporarily
stored while processing information, and to an increased ability to direct attention to relevant information while ignoring irrelevant
information (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). A linear increase in performance from age
4–15 years has been found for working memory measures associated with the phonological loop (phonological short-term store where
rehearsal takes place), the visuospatial sketchpad (stores visual and spatial material) and the central executive (responsible for
regulatory functions including attention and problem solving) (Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004). de Wilde, Koot,
and van Lier (2016) found that lower working memory scores were related to increases in teacher-child conﬂict one year later, and
that teacher-child conﬂict was negatively associated with the development of working memory, suggesting that working memory can
aﬀect social development, and vice-versa. Decision-making is more diﬃcult in situations with high working memory load, i.e. when
there is a lot of information from diﬀerent sources. Increased working memory load can lead to more impulsive decisions (Hinson,
Jameson, & Whitney, 2003) and prevent somatic markers from being produced (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002), suggesting that
individuals with low working memory capacity are likely to have more diﬃculty making moral decisions when working memory
demands are high.
Attention works as a ﬁltering process to determine what information from the environment is selected for subsequent perception
(Amso & Scerif, 2015) and development of attentional processes may allow individuals to focus on more details within a situation, or
ﬁlter out irrelevant information. Three main visuospatial attention functions have been proposed: alerting (a state of arousal elicited
by an unexpected external cue), orienting (shifting attention to select information in the environment) and executive attention
(resolving conﬂict between competing inputs) (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). It has been found that visual at-
tention develops rapidly during the ﬁrst 5–10months (Ross-Sheehy, Schneegans, & Spencer, 2015) and staying alert to cues shows
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signiﬁcant developmental improvement after age 7 years in terms of speed of processing (Pozuelos, Paz-Alonso, Castillo, Fuentes, &
Rueda, 2014). Executive attention develops strongly between ages 4 and 6 years (Rueda, Rothbart, McCandliss, Saccomanno, &
Posner, 2005) showing further improvements in late childhood (Pozuelos et al., 2014). A study of 400 3–12 year olds found a staging
in the development of attention and executive functions from age 6 years, starting with the maturing of inhibitory functions, followed
by maturation of auditory and visual attention at age 10 years and the development of ﬂuency in adolescence (Klenberg, Korkman, &
Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001).
A longitudinal study into the neural networks of working memory in a sample of 6–25 year olds revealed that working memory
capacity correlated with activity in frontal and parietal regions, cortical thickness in the parietal cortex, and white matter structure of
fronto-parietal and fronto-striatal tracts, while fractional anisotropy in white matter tracts and caudate activity predicted future
working memory capacity (Darki & Klingberg, 2015). It has been found that adults show similar patterns of neural activation as
children and adolescents during working memory tasks, but adults have more reﬁned, localised activation of regions (Scherf et al.,
2006). A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study of children (aged 7–12 years) and adults (aged 18–31 years) found that children
showed greater functional connectivity of regions in the dorsal attention network compared to adults, whereas adults showed greater
functional connectivity between regions within the ventral attention network than children (Farrant & Uddin, 2015). This pattern of
development of attention networks may be a neural signature of the developmental shift from bottom-up attention mechanisms to
top-down attentional capacities (Farrant & Uddin, 2015).
Abstract reasoning
Abstract reasoning has also been proposed to be important for moral development (Baird, 2008; Piaget, 1932) and refers to the
ability to base reasoning on relationships between representations rather than just simple features of a stimulus (Dumontheil, 2014).
Abstract reasoning may be important for moral development if it enables moral concepts to be understood and applied across
diﬀerent settings, even those not previously experienced. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task is used as a measure of abstract reasoning,
attention regulation and working memory in research studies, and performance on the task has been found to increase with age
(Bujoreanu & Willis, 2008; Somsen, 2007). A shift from using concrete to abstract strategies to solve algebra problems has been found
by age 15–16 years (Susac, Bubic, Vrbanc, & Planinic, 2014) and abstract reasoning has been found to be impaired in children and
adolescents with autism spectrum disorders (Solomon, Buaminger, & Rogers, 2011). A neurodevelopmental study of relational
reasoning (abstract reasoning) found that similar to adults, children recruited the rostrolateral PFC when processing relations but
failed to use this region when integrating across two relations (Crone et al., 2009). Despite the proposal of the importance of abstract
reasoning to moral reasoning development, there is a lack of research linking these components.
Aﬀective empathy, emotion regulation and emotion recognition
Perspective taking, the ability to know and understand the mental states of other people, is the cognitive component of empathy,
while aﬀective empathy allows individuals to experience the feelings of others. Aﬀective empathy (hereafter referred to as empathy)
is the main aﬀective process proposed to be important for moral decision-making and moral development. It is proposed that em-
pathy can act as a motivator for moral behaviour and also a powerful retrieval cue (Hoﬀman, 2000). Similarly to moral terms, there
are issues with how empathy is deﬁned in the literature (Decety & Cowell, 2014) and it is often unclear what aspect of empathy is
being measured in studies.
Concern for others has been measured in infants aged 8–16months, based on their responses to a caregiver and a peer in distress,
ﬁnding that levels of aﬀective and cognitive empathy were evident before 12months and increased gradually to 16months (Roth-
Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011). It was also found that empathy at 10months predicted prosocial behaviour assessed
2–4months later (Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). Children as young as 18months old have been found to help adults in instrumental,
empathic and altruistic contexts, although empathic helping required greater communication input from the adults (Svetlova,
Nichols, & Brownell, 2010).
A critical review of aﬀective empathy did not ﬁnd a consistent relationship between empathy and aggression in children but did
ﬁnd evidence of a negative relationship between empathy and aggression in adolescence (Lovett & Sheﬃeld, 2007). Research has
found that self-reported empathy develops during adolescence (Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 2011) but there is some
evidence that empathic concern does not develop between ages 10–14 years (Garaigordobil, 2009), 13–18 years (Van der Graaﬀ
et al., 2014) or during adulthood (Grühn, Rebucal, Diehl, Lumley, & Labouvie-Vief, 2008). Neuroimaging research has found evi-
dence of separate neural systems for cognitive and aﬀective empathy, with the aﬀective network consisting of the inferior frontal
gyrus, the inferior parietal lobe, the anterior cingulate and the anterior insula (See Shamay-Tsoory, 2011 for a review). Patients with
traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) and lesions in the PFC have been found to have impaired cognitive and aﬀective empathy (de Sousa
et al., 2010, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2004).
The role of empathy in moral decision-making and moral development may be linked to other processes; for empathy to motivate
moral behaviour, individuals must to be able to correctly recognise the emotions of other people, regulate their own emotions, and
retrieve relevant empathy-cognition bonds from memory. Emotion regulation is the control of emotional experience and expression
(Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989) and consists of extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating and
modifying emotional reactions (Thompson, 1994). It has been suggested that there are multiple dimensions of emotion regulation,
including diﬃculties controlling impulses and engaging in goal-directed behaviours when experiencing negative emotions and dif-
ﬁculties (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Eisenberg et al. (2000) found that emotion regulation predicted externalising behaviour for children
prone to negative emotionality and Lockwood, Seara-Cardoso and Viding (2014) found that emotion regulation moderated the
relationship between empathy and self-reported prosocial behaviour in typically developing (TD) adults. A review of emotion
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regulation concluded that it develops through observational learning and modelling, and its development can be aﬀected by par-
enting style and the family environment (Morris, Silk, Steinberg, Myers, & Robinson, 2007). The brain regions involved in emotion
regulation, including the limbic region and PFC, undergo structural and functional development during adolescence (See Ahmed,
Bittencourt-Hewitt, & Sebastian, 2015 for a review) and damage to the PFC has been found to be related to deﬁcits in emotion
regulation (Anderson, Barrash, Bechara, & Tranel, 2006; Salas et al., 2016).
The ability to correctly identify emotions has been proposed to be indirectly involved in moral development; emotion recognition
facilitates social interactions which lead to increases in perspective taking abilities (Anderson & Beauchamp, 2012; Taber-Thomas &
Tranel, 2012). Children as young as 4–6months old are able to distinguish between diﬀerent emotions, and recognise emotions from
faces (Serrano, Iglesias, & Loeches, 1992), but these abilities continue developing into adulthood (Thomas, De Bellis, Graham, &
LaBar, 2007). Various brain regions have been found to be involved in emotion recognition from facial expressions and from speech,
including the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex and the fusiform gyrus (See Adolphs, 2002 for a review), while diﬀerent emotions
appear to activate diﬀerent brain regions, suggesting separate neural systems for diﬀerent emotions (Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, &
Przuntek, 1998) and the ability to correctly recognise emotions from faces has been found to be compromised following brain injuries
(Croker & McDonald, 2005; Ryan et al., 2014; Tonks, Williams, Frampton, Yates, & Slater, 2007).
Moral decision-making and development: toward an integrative framework
Moral decision-making diﬀers from other types of decision-making because the situation has moral rules or principles attached,
which may invoke moral reasoning and the activation of morally relevant schemas from memory. However, moral decision-making
also shares similarities with other types of decision-making as it involves the processing of information and making judgements,
evaluations, and response decisions, which may lead to behavioural action. Like other types of decision-making, moral decision-
making is subject to inﬂuences such as situational factors, personality factors and biases. SIP theory can provide a useful framework
for explaining how decisions are made, and can be adapted to include components relevant to moral decision-making and moral
development.
Moral principles are necessary but not suﬃcient for moral behaviour, (Kohlberg, 1984a); other components and factors which
aﬀect decision-making and behaviour enactment need to be considered. The original SIP model was proposed as an explanation of
aggressive behaviour in children (Crick & Dodge, 1994) and it has been found that aggressive children display atypical SIP skills, and
SIP problems are predictive of aggressive behaviour (Dodge, Laird, Lochman, & Zelli, 2002; Lansford, et al., 2006; Oostermeijer,
Nieuwenhuijzen, van de Ven, Popma, & Jansen, 2016; Ziv & Sorongon, 2011). Such research suggests that the SIP model provides a
sound basis for explaining behaviour, which has not been the focus of previous moral theories. What is known about the development
of moral maturity and related components needs to be linked with what is known about decision-making, to gain a better under-
standing of how moral decisions are made, how they mature over time, and in turn, have a better understanding of moral behaviour.
Although many social, biological and psychological factors are involved in the development of behaviour, the actual behavioural act
is preceded by a decision-making process, whether cognitive, aﬀective or both, which serves as the proximal control mechanism
(Burks, Laird, Dodge, Pettit, & Bates, 1999). Moral response decisions can be conceptualised as the response decision step (Step 5) in a
SIP framework, as the proximal decision before a behavioural response, although a behavioural response may only follow if it is
perceived that one is necessary, and the intended behaviour is able to be carried out.
The Social Information Processing-Moral Decision-Making framework
A conceptual, illustrative framework of moral decision-making and development will now be introduced, showing how the
components of moral decision-making and development suggested by various theories can be integrated into one dynamic ex-
planation of how moral decisions are made and mature over time. We have termed this the Social Information Processing–Moral
Decision-Making (SIP-MDM) framework (Fig. 2). The format owes much to the original (Crick & Dodge, 1994) and more recent
models (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000) but components have been added to each step and the centre of the
model has been reconceptualised, incorporating ideas from developmental psychology and social neuroscience.
How this framework diﬀers from previous SIP models
Arsenio and Lemerise (2004) incorporated some aspects of moral theory by integrating SIP with domain theory, but the SIP-MDM
framework takes integration further by adding components from other moral theories and attempting to add a developmental aspect.
Components marked with a ‘+’ bullet point have been added to previous models (Fig. 2). Italics have been used to show where a
component is not completely new but has been amended slightly, e.g. ‘moral’ added to social schemas. Relevant components have
been added at each step, the centre has been reformulated and Step 5 has been conceptualised as moral response decision. A hor-
izontal arrow has been added to represent maturation over time and each component is hypothesised to develop over time, increasing
the capacity for more mature moral decisions.
Conceptualising Step 5 as moral response decision allows for the framework to explain response decisions made within a moral
dilemma, i.e. a situation within the moral domain where a response decision is required. The SIP-MDM framework could also be used
to explain decision-making in other domains, but if a situation is in the moral domain, and recognised by the individual as having
moral rules or principles attached, then components relevant to moral decision-making, such as moral reasoning, will be activated.
The six steps of the SIP-MDM framework speciﬁcally indicate the processing that is occurring when making a decision about how to
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behave in a moral dilemma. Although the steps of the framework are not strictly sequential, a moral response decision is the proximal
step made before behaviour enactment. Moral decisions which are not response decisions, such as judging or evaluating the actions of
others have been added at Step 2. Such moral judgements and evaluations made when interpreting a situation can inﬂuence whether
a situation itself is viewed as moral or not and can have an eﬀect on subsequent processing, including the response decision that is
chosen at Step 5.
Reformulation of the centre of the SIP-MDM framework expands the database component of previous models by adding aspects
relevant to moral decision-making and development such as moral schemas and perspective taking. The database can be viewed as a
‘store’ of resources that can be drawn upon when processing information. Social factors and brain development have also been added
to the centre alongside the database (Crick & Dodge, 1994) and emotion processes (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000). Social factors can
inﬂuence the development of other components. For example, peer interaction can inﬂuence the development of perspective taking
through role-taking with peers (Gibbs, 2013; Piaget, 1932), and the relationships between parenting practice and behaviour may be
mediated by SIP (Palmer, 2000). Brain development can inﬂuence moral decision-making directly, as brain regions relevant to real-
time decision-making mature, and also indirectly, via its inﬂuence on the development of component processes such as working
memory and empathy. Connections between brain regions can also lead to increases in processing eﬃciency. Decreases in reaction
times for adults compared to adolescents when making moral decisions indicates that adults become more eﬃcient at processing such
information (Dosch et al., 2010). Adding these components to the centre of the framework shows how they can be used in making
real-time decisions, but also that their development over time can lead to more eﬃcient processing and mature moral decision-
making.
All the relationships in this framework are multi-directional: the components in the centre of the framework can inﬂuence each
step of information processing, and engaging in processing can inﬂuence the development of components within the centre of the
framework (e.g. moral schemas), in turn inﬂuencing future moral decision-making. The thick arrows from the centre to each step
indicate the components in the centre inﬂuencing real-time decisions, and the dashed arrows indicate information processing in-
ﬂuencing development of components in the centre. The arrows are separate as this relationship is not entirely cyclical; although
engaging in SIP can inﬂuence development of factors in the centre, development occurs over time and so cannot be used in the same
situation.
This SIP-MDM framework suggests how moral decisions can be driven by both automatic processes and by reasoning. Somatic
markers have been added (Step 4), as a component which can aﬀect decision-making, narrowing down possible responses in a
situation. It has been found that typical immoral events require shorter judgement decision times than atypical events (Fransson &
Ask, 2010), suggesting that more common moral decisions may require less reasoning. Moral reasoning has been added at Step 5, as a
Fig. 2. The Social Information Processing-Moral Decision-Making Framework (SIP-MDM).
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component involved in making a moral response decision. Moral reasoning is just one of the processes which guides moral decisions,
although it draws upon and is dependent upon other components such as emotion expectancies, attention, encoding, working
memory, and perspective taking. Even though initial decisions may be driven by some somatic markers or automatic activation of a
moral schema at Step 4, reasoning is required to conﬁrm, reject or reformulate this into a moral decision (Kahneman, 2011). Moral
reasoning in a given situation depends on the processing at other steps of the framework, and to what extent the situation activates
moral schemas.
Cognitive and aﬀective components suggested by various moral theories have been added at relevant SIP steps. Crick and Dodge
(1994) hypothesised that SIP abilities develop with age partly due to developmental shifts in attentional ability, and Gibbs (2013)
proposed that attention is important for moral development, but it has not been explicitly included in previous SIP models. Here,
attention has been added to Step 1. It is proposed that at Step 1, where cues are encoded, attentional abilities (e.g. shifting attention
and executive attention) and attentional bias will inﬂuence what information is encoded, which then impacts upon what information
is available for subsequent processing. Attention has also been added to the database as a process that can develop over time and lead
to increased eﬃciency of SIP and the capacity for more mature moral-decisions. Working memory has been added to Steps 2 and 5,
and to the database of the SIP-MDM framework. It is hypothesised that increases in working memory capacity, and the ability to
direct attention to relevant information while ignoring irrelevant information will aid the interpretation of cues and the moral
decision-making step. Inhibition/self-control has been added at Step 5, as a process that can guide response decisions (Rest, 1984;
Rest et al., 1999), as certain possible responses may need to be inhibited.
Perspective taking/ToM has been added at Step 2 and the database. Making appropriate attributions at Step 2 relies on the ability
to accurately infer the beliefs and intentions of other people, and as perspective taking develops over time, it can inﬂuence all SIP
steps by making processing less egocentric. Emotional processes were added to the SIP model by Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) but the
SIP-MDM framework also includes empathic arousal at Step 3 and it is proposed that individuals with greater empathic arousal will
select more prosocial goals. Abstract thought/reasoning has been added at Steps 3 and 4 and to the database. At Step 3, abstract
thought will allow individuals to think of a goal not previously experienced, and at Step 4 it will allow for responses not previously
enacted to be constructed. Development of abstract reasoning skills can impact on other steps of processing through its eﬀect on
moral development; it allows for moral concepts to be understood and applied across diﬀerent settings, including those not previously
encountered. ‘Situational factors’ have been added at Steps 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Level of moral reasoning varies according to context or
situation (Krebs, Vermeulen, Carpendale, & Denton, 2014), and can be inﬂuenced by factors such as alcohol intake (Denton & Krebs,
1990). Situational factors may be of most importance at Step 6 following the moral response decision at Step 5 and may account for
diﬀerences between moral decisions and moral behaviour. While the SIP-MDM framework acknowledges that situational factors need
to be taken into account when explaining moral decision-making and behaviour, further research is needed into the relevant si-
tuational factors.
Moral decision-making within the SIP-MDM framework
Although the six steps are not necessarily how processing occurs in every situation, the order of the six steps will now be used to
illustrate how a moral response decision may be made in an everyday moral dilemma (a situation with moral rules or principles
attached where a response decision is required), using the example of deciding whether to cheat during a game of Monopoly with
friends (an example scenario used in the So-Moral, Dooley et al., 2010). How an individual may decide to cheat in this situation,
based on the suggested framework will be discussed, but how an alternative behavioural action (not cheating) may occur will also be
outlined.
At Step 1 the individual will encode the cues such as looking at how much money each player has, encoding the other players’
emotions, including their own emotions, and encoding situational cues such as the opportunity to cheat (e.g. other players are
distracted or have left the room). Encoding these cues will require attention abilities and emotion recognition, and which cues are
encoded will aﬀect subsequent processing. Encoded cues are then interpreted at Step 2; this is an important step and is where a
situation is recognised as having moral rules attached or not, through moral judgements and evaluations. For cheating at the game to
occur, an individual may either not recognise that this situation has moral rules attached, e.g. they may think that because it is a game
with friends, “moral rules” governing cheating may not apply, or they do recognise the moral rules attached, but still decide to cheat
for various reasons, e.g. they are losing and want to win, which is an attribution and evaluative process. In interpreting cues, the
individual may engage in perspective taking; thinking how their friends might feel if they cheated, or thinking how they would feel if
their friends cheated, which could inﬂuence the goals they set in the situation. In interpreting cues, the individual may also engage in
various evaluations such as evaluating theirs and their friends’ past performances of playing Monopoly, which will require working
memory in order to keep various sources of information in mind.
At Step 3, goals for the situation are set, and these can be inﬂuenced by whether or not empathic arousal occurs, and also
inﬂuenced by situational factors (e.g. does the opportunity to cheat still exist). This step is where an individual decides what they
want from the situation, such as to cheat at the game by possibly gaining more money to play with, and increasing their chances of
winning. Possible responses are accessed or constructed at Step 4. In this example, an individual may think of various ways in which
they can cheat, such as taking some extra money from the bank or hiding some of the other players’ money. Responses thought about
at this step can be inﬂuenced by somatic markers and situational factors, and may require abstract thought. A Step 5, the moral
response decision is made, i.e. to cheat and how to cheat, or to not cheat and continue to play by the rules. Deliberation occurs at this
step, which may include engaging in moral reasoning and evaluating the expected outcome. A self-eﬃcacy evaluation may also occur
at this step, where the individual evaluates their ability to carry out their intended behavioural action, e.g. evaluating if they would
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be able to take extra money without being caught by the other players. Deliberation at this step could lead to a change in the selected
goal, or a change to the chosen response option. The response decided upon at Step 5, to cheat or not to cheat at the game, will be
enacted at Step 6 unless situational factors change (e.g. the opportunity to cheat no longer exists, or increases), or the individual over
estimated their ability to carry out their chosen course of action. As stated, the steps do not necessarily occur in this order, and
processing can be rapid.
In terms of choosing a moral or prosocial course of action, in the Monopoly example, an individual may not cheat either because
they do not consider cheating as a possible action, or they may consider it but decide against it for various reasons. If an opportunity
to cheat was either not encoded (not noticed), or was not interpreted as such, then there is no moral dilemma and no response
decision to be made. An individual may recognise the opportunity to cheat but not consider it a possible action, which may be due to
knowledge of moral rules related to the speciﬁc situation (knowledge that cheating is bad), or due to a deeper understanding and
moral necessities (an appreciation of fairness). As individuals develop moral maturity, more decisions will be made based on a deeper
understanding of moral necessities, rather than on situation speciﬁc moral rules. At each step, certain components can inﬂuence an
individual’s decision-making, leading them to decide not to cheat. For example, engaging in perspective taking at Step 2 may lead an
individual to decide that the other players would be distressed and less likely to trust them if they cheated, or thinking about the ways
to cheat at this step might trigger a somatic marker, or aﬀective empathy, which feels unpleasant and rules out cheating as a viable
option. As previously stated, the 6 steps are not sequential and can impact on each other, for example, which cues are encoded Step 1
can be aﬀected by existing goals or motivation, which can bias encoding of cues through selective attention.
Moral development within the SIP-MDM framework
In terms of the development of moral decision-making in such a framework, the development of each of the components of the
framework leads to an increased eﬃciency of decision-making. For example, increases in the ability to recognise emotions (Step 1)
will enable such cues to be encoded and used in processing a situation, and increases in working memory, including attentional
control (Step 2) will allow for more relevant features of a situation to be taken into account when making a decision. However, to
fully achieve the capacity for mature moral decision-making, the components in the database also need to develop. Each of the
components of the framework are necessary but not suﬃcient for moral development; the capacity to make mature moral decisions
requires the development of many component processes, including the database, and whether mature real-time moral decisions are
actually made depends on the processing that occurs, which can be inﬂuenced by situational factors. Based on this framework, to be
able to make a mature moral decision in a moral dilemma (i.e. a decision based on an appreciation of moral necessities), an individual
needs to have both a developed database and suﬃciently developed component processes to be able to process information in a
situation.
One important diﬀerence to this framework compared to previous SIP models is the extension of the database to add components
thought to be crucial for moral development, such as perspective taking, an understanding of moral necessities, working memory,
attention and abstract reasoning. Moral development is not just achieved through an increase in moral knowledge and improvements
in information processing eﬃciency, but also involves the development of perspective taking and an appreciation of moral necessities
for “growth beyond the superﬁcial” (Gibbs, 2013). Immature moral reasoning is proposed by cognitive-developmental theorists to be
rule orientated and young children have been found to show an understanding of moral rules (Kiley Hamlin et al., 2010). In a moral
dilemma with strong or obvious moral rules attached (e.g. it is wrong to steal from a shop), young children are likely to make
prosocial moral decisions, but when the moral rules of the situation are more ambiguous they may struggle to recognise the relevant
moral principles, due to immature abstract reasoning skills and a lack of appreciation of moral necessities. Additionally, young
children may also struggle when making moral decisions in situations where the working memory load is high or they are unable to
correctly identify the emotions of others.
While a capacity for making mature moral decisions develops with age and experience, factors will aﬀect whether or not a mature
moral decision is made. An individual may have the capacity for making mature moral decisions but the processing that occurs in a
situation, which can be inﬂuenced by biases and situational factors, can aﬀect whether or not the situation is recognised as being in
the moral domain. Components such as working memory and abstract reasoning develop during adolescence which may increase the
eﬃciency of information processing but competing reward and control systems in the developing adolescent brain can aﬀect deci-
sion-making, leading to increased risk-taking (Steinberg, 2007), and potentially antisocial moral decisions. There are also diﬀerent
situational factors which are of relevance at diﬀerent ages, for example peer inﬂuences are particularly important during adolescence;
the presence of peers can aﬀect adolescents’ decision-making (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005).
Our suggested framework is dynamic and is in line with the argument made by Rest et al. (1999) that development is gradual
rather than one step at a time. Each of the components of the model develops with age and experience, either due directly or
indirectly to the maturation of the brain, which occurs with growth and socialisation. Damage to the brain may alter the develop-
mental trajectories of these components, resulting in less eﬃcient social information processing and delayed moral development,
having a subsequent eﬀect upon behaviour. The horizontal arrow at the bottom of the framework is to illustrate that the whole
process develops over time, but this developmental aspect could be greatly expanded upon by research into developmental re-
lationships between components. Mature moral decisions may result in prosocial behaviour but other factors also inﬂuence beha-
viour, and such factors and their eﬀects (e.g. peer inﬂuence) can change over time. Behaviour enactment, at Step 6 of this framework
is a result of processing that occurs in a situation, the integrity of the component processes at each step and in the centre of the
framework, and also situational factors.
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Promise and limitations of an integrated developmental framework of moral decision making
Developmental psychology and social neuroscience approaches to moral decision-making and development have developed se-
parately, with diﬀerent research methods and informed by separate theories. Theories and research have tended to focus on moral
decisions rather than behaviour as the end point. There have also been divides within theories from these disciplines, such as whether
moral decisions are driven by intuitions or reasoning. Furthermore, although many components have been proposed to be important
for moral decision-making and development, these have not previously been integrated into one comprehensive theory, and research
does not tend to measure multiple components to assess relationships between them.
Looking to the future of moral theory development, our suggested SIP-MDM framework oﬀers promise that concepts from de-
velopmental psychology and social neuroscience can be incorporated into one integrative framework. This framework goes beyond
previous integrations with SIP theory as it incorporates ideas from various moral theories rather than just moral domain theory. It is
also a step towards a dynamic model of moral decision-making, which was suggested by Van Bavel et al. (2015) and shows how moral
decisions are not just driven by automatic intuitive processes and/or slower reasoning processes, but that many other components
and factors are involved. This framework includes brain development but also references the rich tradition of developmental psy-
chology. Using the term ‘moral decision-making’ places moral decisions alongside other types of decision-making, which can help in
thinking about the general inﬂuences and processes that guide such decisions (e.g. situational factors), along with the morally speciﬁc
processes, creating richer explanations of decisions and behaviour. While not a working model, this framework can oﬀer predictions
to be tested by future research studies, leading to further clariﬁcation of the framework, hopefully increasing insight into devel-
opmental relationships between components, in turn leading to better predictions of behaviour, and hopefully more creative ways of
helping those who have diﬃculties within components described within our framework.
As antisocial behaviour involves breaking moral rules of a culture or society, bearing in mind that many of these rules are socially
constructed, it could be explained using a moral SIP framework. In our suggested framework, antisocial behaviour could be explained
as behaviour based on immature moral decision making, which could either be the result of (a) developmental delay or deﬁciencies in
one or more of the component processes such as perspective taking or working memory, or (b) due to an underdeveloped database (a
lack of adaptive moral schemas or an understanding of moral necessities), or (c) it could be the result of poor information processing,
such as failing to attend to all the salient feature of a situation, a misinterpretation of cues, or failing to recognise a situation as having
moral rules attached. This ﬁts with the Situational Action Theory of crime (Wikström, 2005; Wikström, Oberwittler, Treiber, &
Hardie, 2012) which proposes that crimes are moral actions, that crime involves an interaction of personal and environmental
factors, and that whether an individual views crime as a possible action in a situation is determined by their moral evaluation of
action alternatives.
Screening some of the component skills of our suggested framework in atypically developing individuals, or those at risk of
engaging in antisocial behaviours could allow for targeted interventions which may prove more useful than general interventions. For
example, people with brain injuries and also oﬀender populations have been found to have deﬁcits in facial emotion recognition
(Croker & McDonald, 2005; Robinson et al., 2012). If an individual has deﬁcits in emotion recognition, our framework would suggest
that they will have problems encoding this information, which may potentially bias subsequent processing and moral decisions and
behaviour. Teaching generic social problem solving skills may be of limited utility in such a case, as in a real life situation the
individual will still struggle to use information from others’ facial expressions in their moral decision-making, so emotion recognition
training may be more beneﬁcial. It has been found that modiﬁcation training, to encourage the perception of happiness over anger in
ambiguous facial expressions, results in a decrease in self-reported anger and aggression in TD adults and adolescents at risk of
engaging in oﬀending behaviour (Penton-Voak et al., 2013). It is also possible to increase moral behaviour and reduce antisocial
behaviour by training individuals in some of the component processes; a study which trained perspective taking abilities in preschool
children found that training increased visual, cognitive and aﬀective perspective taking, and that these increases were related to
increased prosocial behaviour and decreases in aggressiveness (Cigala, Mori, & Fangareggi, 2015). Further increases in prosocial
behaviour and decreases in aggression may potentially be achieved by training individuals in some additional components, such as
moral reasoning, moral rules and attention and working memory. Further investigation of how components relate to behaviour can
help to determine which components it would be most useful to target for intervention.
While there is promise of what a fully integrative working model of moral decision-making and development could oﬀer, de-
veloping such a model that predicts moral decision-making, moral development and moral behaviour is an ambitious task. In in-
corporating all of the components thought to be involved, there is a risk of creating a theory of everything, which is too broad and
non-speciﬁc, or overly complicated. There are also challenges in reconciling diﬀering theories and philosophical viewpoints, and also
incorporating social neuroscience research which has largely developed separately from developmental psychology research. Bearing
in mind these limitations, we will now discuss some suggestions for future research, which we see as the next step to creating an
integrative model.
Using the SIP-MDM to guide research
It was beyond the scope of the current paper to systematically review all research into the development of all of the components of
moral decision-making and moral development but we have summarised selected research, which suggests that all the component
processes mature with age. Studies typically just measure one component of moral decision-making or moral development, but some
studies have found developmental and predictive relationships between components (Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 2010;
de Wilde et al., 2016; Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & van Court, 1995; Peterson et al., 2016) and that training some of the components
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can lead to improvements in prosocial behaviour (Cigala et al., 2015). Further developmental research which measures moral de-
cision-making alongside some of the other component processes (e.g. perspective taking and emotion recognition), SIP skills and
behaviour can help to provide a clearer picture of the relationships between all of these components, including predictive re-
lationships.
The framework presented here attempts to consider how moral decision-making may occur and how development of the com-
ponents can increase the capacity for mature moral decision-making. Research is needed to either conﬁrm or reject the predictions of
this framework, for example, does developmental progression in emotion recognition abilities aﬀect what is encoded in a moral
dilemma, and does this in turn have any eﬀect on moral decision-making and behaviour? Our suggested framework can be used to
generate such hypotheses about moral decision-making and moral development, to guide research and theory development. Testing
some of these hypotheses in TD samples can provide information about the typical developmental relationships between components.
Testing hypotheses of the SIP-MDM framework in atypically developing samples can provide information about how diﬃculties in
certain components can impact the moral decision-making process and moral development.
Conceptualising moral response decisions within a SIP framework allows for such decisions to be measured with a SIP instrument,
using vignettes which depict violations of moral rules or principles. Measuring moral decisions this way could allow for an in-
vestigation of how more real-life moral response decisions are made, based on a response constructed by the individual rather than
forced-choices in hypothetical dilemmas. For example, the social information processing test (van Nieuwenhuijzen, Vriens,
Scheepmaker, Smit, & Porton, 2011) includes a vignette of a boy in a wheelchair being bullied, which relates to the moral principles
of justice and harm, and decisions about this dilemma are more ‘real-life’ than choosing to kill one person or to kill ﬁve people
(Greene et al, 2001). Future studies could use a SIP measure alongside measures of moral reasoning and other component processes,
to provide a better understanding of relationships between the components.
Further research into which brain areas are recruited when making diﬀerent types of moral decisions is needed in order to expand
on the brain development component of the SIP-MDM framework. Developmental neuroimaging studies could provide insight into
how the brain networks for moral decisions change with age. Evidence from neuroscience suggests that the vmPFC is the brain region
most commonly recruited for moral decision-making, but neuroscience studies tend to use utilitarian hypothetical dilemmas in-
volving life or death choices (Greene et al., 2001), which do not to reﬂect the everyday moral decision-making of most people.
Furthermore, the vmPFC has been found to be recruited during other types of decision-making, such as decisions relating to food
choice (Hare, Malmaud, & Rangel, 2011), so it is not a uniquely moral brain region. Many components, such as empathy, perspective
taking and working memory are proposed to be important for moral decision-making maturity, so a wide range of brain regions and
networks may underpin moral decision-making and development. Research which measures brain development from infancy to
adulthood, alongside measuring moral reasoning and related components such as perspective taking, would provide a fuller picture of
the brain networks required for moral decision-making. Such research would allow the ‘brain development’ of our framework to be
greatly expanded upon, pinpointing which brain regions are most important for the maturation of moral decision-making, and
highlighting developmental windows of importance which can be useful in training to enhance moral decision-making.
Measuring some of the components of the SIP-MDM framework in individuals, such as their moral reasoning level and SIP skills,
may allow for a prediction of how they are likely to act in moral situations, but without further exploration of all relevant situational
factors, behavioural prediction would not be possible. Further research into the situational factors that may aﬀect moral decision-
making will help to better predict moral behaviour. Situational factors have been incorporated into some steps of the SIP-MDM
framework but this is an area that needs further research and clariﬁcation in order to improve the predictive power of such a
framework in diﬀerent situations. Research from criminological literature can add to our knowledge of relevant contextual and
situational factors for oﬀending behaviour, and how these interact with other factors and change over time. For example, peer
inﬂuence is particularly important during adolescence and adolescents are more likely to oﬀend when unsupervised with peers
(Wikström, Ceccato, Hardie, & Treiber, 2010).
Conclusion
Moral decision-making and development are complex processes involving many components. In this paper we have highlighted
‘what develops’, i.e. the component processes and factors outlined by the various theories and perspectives, and discussed research
into how these components develop. The SIP-MDM framework is the ﬁrst attempt to incorporate all of the suggested relevant
components into one descriptive framework of moral decision-making, moral development and behaviour. This framework expands
the deﬁnition of moral development to incorporate the maturation of relevant component processes, as well as the maturation of
moral decision-making, including moral reasoning. Development of the components, including the database, can lead to an increase
in the capacity for making more mature moral decisions, but whether a mature moral response decision is made, and results in a
moral behaviour will depend on situational factors and the processing that occurs in that situation. Our framework can explain how
real-time moral decisions are made, and can help in describing the components that need to develop in order for mature moral
decisions to be able to occur. Further research in this area can provide either support for this framework, or arguments for re-
formulation. For a fully working model which explains both moral decision-making and behaviour alongside moral development,
speciﬁc situational factors need to be further explored and developmental processes, including brain development, expanded upon.
Acknowledgements
Beverley Garrigan is supported by a PhD studentship stipend from the University of East Anglia.
B. Garrigan et al. Developmental Review xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
17
Peter E Langdon is funded by a National Institute for Health Research Postdoctoral Fellowship. This article presents independent
research funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR). The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not
necessarily those of the National Health Service, the National Institute for Health Research or the Department of Health.
References
Adolphs, R. (2002). Neural systems for recognizing emotion. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 12(2), 169–177.
Ahmed, S. P, Bittencourt-Hewitt, A., & Sebastian, C. L. (2015). Neurocognitive bases of emotion regulation development in adolescence. Developmental Cognitive
Neuroscience, 15, 11–25.
Amso, D., & Scerif, G. (2015). The attentive brain: Insights from developmental cognitive neuroscience. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 16(10), 606–619. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1038/nrn4025.
Anderson, C. A, & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Psychology, 53(1), 27.
Anderson, S. W., Barrash, J., Bechara, A., & Tranel, D. (2006). Impairments of emotion and real-world complex behavior following childhood-or adult-onset damage to
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 12(02), 224–235.
Anderson, V., & Beauchamp, M. (2012). SOCIAL: A theoretical model of developmental social neuroscience. In V. Anderson, & Miriam Beauchamp (Eds.).
Developmental social neuroscience and childhood brain insult (pp. 3–23). New York: Guilford Press.
Arsenio, W. F., & Lemerise, E. A. (2004). Aggression and moral development: Integrating social information processing and moral domain models. Child Development,
75(4), 987–1002.
Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. In H. Bower Gordon (Vol. Ed.), Psychology of learning and motivation: Vol. 8, (pp. 47–89). Academic Press.
Baird, A. (2008). Adolescent moral reasoning: The integration of emotion and cognition. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), The Neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain
disorders, and development (Vol. Moral Psychology, Vol 2, pp. 323–343). MIT Press.
Beauchamp, M., Dooley, J. J, & Anderson, V. (2013). A preliminary investigation of moral reasoning and empathy after traumatic brain injury in adolescents. Brain
Injury, Early Online, 1–7.
Bechara, A., & Damasio, A. R. (2005). The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision. Games and Economic Behavior, 52(2), 336–372.
Blasi, A. (1983). Moral cognition and moral action: A theoretical perspective. Developmental Review, 3(2), 178–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0273-2297(83)
90029-1.
Bujoreanu, I. S., & Willis, W. G. (2008). Developmental and neuropsychological perspectives on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test in children. Developmental
Neuropsychology, 33(5), 584–600.
Burks, V., Laird, R. D., Dodge, K. A., Pettit, G. S., & Bates, J. E. (1999). Knowledge structures, social information processing, and children’s aggressive behavior. Social
Development, 8(2), 220–236.
Calvete, E., & Orue, I. (2012). Social information processing as a mediator between cognitive schemas and aggressive behavior in adolescents. Journal of Abnormal
Child Psychology, 40(1), 105–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10802-011-9546-y.
Campos, J. J., Campos, R. G., & Barrett, K. C. (1989). Emergent themes in the study of emotional development and emotion regulation. Developmental Psychology,
25(3), 394.
Carlo, G., Mestre, M. V., Samper, P., Tur, A., & Armenta, B. E. (2011). The longitudinal relations among dimensions of parenting styles, sympathy, prosocial moral
reasoning, and prosocial behaviors. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 35(2), 116–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0165025410375921.
Carlo, G., Mestre, M. V., Samper, P., Tur, A., & Armenta, B. E. (2010). Feelings or cognitions? Moral cognitions and emotions as longitudinal predictors of prosocial and
aggressive behaviors. Personality and Individual Diﬀerences, 48(8), 872–877.
Chiasson, V., Vera-Estay, E., Lalonde, G., Dooley, J. J., & Beauchamp, M. H. (2017). Assessing social cognition: Age-related changes in moral reasoning in childhood
and adolescence. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 31(3), 515–530. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13854046.2016.1268650.
Choudhury, S., Blakemore, S.-J., & Charman, T. (2006). Social cognitive development during adolescence. Social Cognitive and Aﬀective Neuroscience, 1(3), 165–174.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsl024.
Cigala, A., Mori, A., & Fangareggi, F. (2015). Learning others' point of view: Perspective taking and prosocial behaviour in preschoolers. Early Child Development and
Care, 185(8), 1199–1215.
Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J., Lieberman, M., Fischer, K., & Saltzstein, H. D. (1983). A longitudinal study of moral judgment. Monographs of the Society for Research
in Child Development, 1–124.
Crick, N. R, & Dodge, K. A. (1994). A review and reformulation of social information-processing mechanisms in children's social adjustment. Psychological bulletin,
115(1), 74.
Croker, V., & McDonald, S. (2005). Recognition of emotion from facial expression following traumatic brain injury. Brain Injury, 19(10), 787–799.
Crone, E. A., Wendelken, C., Van Leijenhorst, L., Honomichl, R. D., Christoﬀ, K., & Bunge, S. A. (2009). Neurocognitive development of relational reasoning.
Developmental Science, 12(1), 55–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00743.x.
Cushman, F., Sheketoﬀ, R., Wharton, S., & Carey, S. (2013). The development of intent-based moral judgment. Cognition, 127(1), 6–21.
Damasio, R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: HarperCollins.
Darki, F., & Klingberg, T. (2015). The role of fronto-parietal and fronto-striatal networks in the development of working memory: A longitudinal study. Cerebral Cortex,
25(6), 1587–1595. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bht352.
de Sousa, A., McDonald, S., Rushby, J., Li, S., Dimoska, A., & James, C. (2010). Why don't you feel how I feel? Insight into the absence of empathy after severe
traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychologia, 48(12), 3585.
de Sousa, A., McDonald, S., Rushby, J., Li, S., Dimoska, A., & James, C. (2011). Understanding deﬁcits in empathy after traumatic brain injury: The role of aﬀective
responsivity. Cortex, 47(5), 526–535. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2010.02.004.
de Wilde, A., Koot, H. M, & van Lier, P. A. C. (2016). Developmental links between children’s working memory and their social relations with teachers and peers in the
early school years. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 44(1), 19–30.
Decety, J., & Cowell, J. M. (2014). The complex relation between morality and empathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(7), 337–339.
Denton, K., & Krebs, D. (1990). From the scene to the crime: The eﬀect of alcohol and social context on moral judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
59(2), 242.
Dodge, K. A., Laird, R., Lochman, J. E., & Zelli, Arnaldo (2002). Multidimensional latent-construct analysis of children's social information processing patterns:
Correlations with aggressive behavior problems. Psychological Assessment, 14(1), 60.
Dooley, J. J., Beauchamp, M., & Anderson, V. A. (2010). The measurement of sociomoral reasoning in adolescents with traumatic brain injury: A pilot investigation.
Brain Impairment, 11(02), 152–161.
Dosch, M., Loenneker, T., Bucher, K., Martin, E., & Klaver, P. (2010). Learning to appreciate others: Neural development of cognitive perspective taking. NeuroImage,
50(2), 837–846.
Dumontheil, I. (2014). Development of abstract thinking during childhood and adolescence: The role of rostrolateral prefrontal cortex. Developmental Cognitive
Neuroscience, 10, 57–76.
Dumontheil, I., Apperly, I. A., & Blakemore, S.-J. (2010). Online usage of theory of mind continues to develop in late adolescence. Developmental Science, 13(2),
331–338.
Duska, R., & Whelan, M. (1977). Moral development: A guide to Piaget and Kohlberg. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.
Eisenberg, N., Carlo, G., Murphy, B., & van Court, P. (1995). Prosocial development in late adolescence: A longitudinal study. Child Development, 66(4), 1179–1197.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1131806.
B. Garrigan et al. Developmental Review xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
18
Eisenberg, N., Guthrie, I. K., Fabes, R. A., Shepard, S., Losoya, S., Murphy, B., ... Reiser, M. (2000). Prediction of elementary school children's externalizing problem
behaviors from attentional and behavioral regulation and negative emotionality. Child Development, 71(5), 1367–1382.
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. A. (1999). Working memory, short-term memory, and general ﬂuid intelligence: A latent-variable
approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128(3), 309.
Etkin, A., Egner, T., & Kalisch, R. (2011). Emotional processing in anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(2), 85–93.
Fan, J., McCandliss, B. D., Sommer, T., Raz, A., & Posner, M. I. (2002). Testing the eﬃciency and independence of attentional networks. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 14(3), 340–347.
Farrant, K., & Uddin, L. Q. (2015). Asymmetric development of dorsal and ventral attention networks in the human brain. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 12,
165–174.
Fiedler, S., & Glöckner, A. (2015). Attention and moral behavior. Current Opinion in Psychology, 6, 139–144.
Fransson, N., & Ask, K. (2010). A cognitive-representational account of intuitive moral judgment: Eﬀects of typicality and accessibility. Open Psychology Journal, 3,
67–75.
Fumagalli, M., & Priori, A. (2012). Functional and clinical neuroanatomy of morality. Brain, 135(7), 2006–2021.
Garaigordobil, M. (2009). A comparative analysis of empathy in childhood and adolescence: Gender diﬀerences and associated socio-emotional variables. Revista
Internacional de Psicología y Terapia Psicológica, 9(2), 217–235.
Gardner, M., & Steinberg, L. (2005). Peer inﬂuence on risk taking, risk preference, and risky decision making in adolescence and adulthood: An experimental study.
Developmental Psychology, 41(4), 625.
Garrigan, B., Adlam, A. L., & Langdon, P. E. (2016a). Corrigendum to “The neural correlates of moral decision-making: A systematic review and meta-analysis of moral
evaluations and response decision judgements” [Brain Cogn. 108 (2016) 88-97]. Brain and Cognition, 111, 104.
Garrigan, B., Adlam, A. L. R., & Langdon, P. E. (2016b). The neural correlates of moral decision-making: A systematic review and meta-analysis of moral evaluations
and response decision judgements. Brain and Cognition, 108, 88–97.
Gathercole, S. E, Pickering, S. J, Ambridge, B., & Wearing, H. (2004). The structure of working memory from 4 to 15 years of age. Developmental Psychology, 40(2), 177.
Gibbs, J. C. (2013). Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg, Hoﬀman, and Haidt. Oxford University Press.
Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., & Fuller, D. (1992). Moral maturity: Measuring the development of sociomoral reﬂection. Routledge.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a diﬀerent voice: Psychological theory and women's development, 326. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Gratz, K. L., & Roemer, L. (2004). Multidimensional assessment of emotion regulation and dysregulation: Development, factor structure, and initial validation of the
diﬃculties in emotion regulation scale. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 26(1), 41–54.
Greene, J. D. (2009). The cognitive neuroscience of moral judgment. In M. S. Gazzaniga, E. Bizzi, L. M. Chalupa, S. T. Grafton, T. F. Heatherton, C. Koch, … B. A.
Wandell (Eds.), The cognitive neurosciences (4th ed.) (pp. 987-999). Cambridge, MA US: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008). Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition,
107(3), 1144–1154. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004.
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conﬂict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44(2),
389–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027.
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science,
293(5537), 2105–2108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1062872.
Grühn, D., Rebucal, K., Diehl, M., Lumley, M., & Labouvie-Vief, G. (2008). Empathy across the adult lifespan: longitudinal and experience-sampling ﬁndings. Emotion
(Washington, D.C.), 8(6), 753–765. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014123.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814.
Haidt, J., & Bjorklund, F. (2008). Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral psychology. Moral Psychology, 2, 181–217.
Haidt, J., & Hersh, M. A. (2001). Sexual morality: The cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31(1), 191–221.
Hare, T. A., Malmaud, J., & Rangel, A. (2011). Focusing attention on the health aspects of foods changes value signals in vmPFC and improves dietary choice. Journal of
Neuroscience, 31(30), 11077–11087.
Harenski, C. L., Harenski, K. A., Shane, M. S., & Kiehl, K. A. (2012). Neural development of mentalizing in moral judgment from adolescence to adulthood.
Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 2(1), 162–173. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2011.09.002.
Hinson, J. M, Jameson, T. L, & Whitney, P. (2002). Somatic markers, working memory, and decision making. Cognitive, Aﬀective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 2(4),
341–353.
Hinson, J. M., Jameson, T. L., & Whitney, P. (2003). Impulsive decision making and working memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 29(2), 298.
Hoﬀman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice. Cambridge University Press.
Humphries, M. L., Parker, B. L., & Jagers, R. J. (2000). Predictors of moral reasoning among African American children: A preliminary study. Journal of Black
Psychology, 26(1), 51–64.
Kagan, J. (2008). Morailty and its Development. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain disorders, and Development (Vol. Moral
Psychology, Vol 2, pp. 297–313). MIT Press.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan.
Kiley Hamlin, J., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2010). Three-month-olds show a negativity bias in their social evaluations. Developmental Science, 13(6), 923–929.
Killen, M., & Smetana, J. G. (1999). Social interactions in preschool classrooms and the development of young children's conceptions of the personal. Child
Development, 70(2), 486–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1132102.
Klenberg, L., Korkman, M., & Lahti-Nuuttila, P. (2001). Diﬀerential development of attention and executive functions in 3- to 12-year-old ﬁnnish children.
Developmental Neuropsychology, 20(1), 407–428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15326942DN2001_6.
Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: the cognitive-developmental approach. In T. Lickona (Ed.). Moral development and behavior: Theory, research and
social issues (pp. 31–54). New York; London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development: Moral stages and the idea of justice.
Kohlberg, L. (1984a). Essays on moral development, Vol. II. Harper and Row, New York: The psychology of moral development.
Kohlberg, L. (1984b). The psychology or moral development: The nature and validity of moral stages, 2. San Francisco; London: Harper and Row.
Krebs, D. L., & Denton, K. (2005). Toward a more pragmatic approach to morality: A critical evaluation of Kohlberg's model. Psychological Review, 112(3), 629.
Krebs, D. L, Vermeulen, S., Carpendale, J., & Denton, K. (2014). Structural and situational inﬂuences on moral judgment: The interaction between stage and dilemma.
In W. M. Kurtines, & J. L. Gewirtz (Ed.), Handbook of moral behavior and development (Vol. 1, pp. 139-169).
Lansford, J. E., Malone, P. S., Dodge, K. A., Crozier, J. C., Pettit, G. S., & Bates, J. E. (2006). A 12-year prospective study of patterns of social information processing
problems and externalizing behaviors. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 34(5), 715–724. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10802-006-9057-4.
Lemerise, E. A., & Arsenio, W. F. (2000). An integrated model of emotion processes and cognition in social information processing. Child Development, 71(1), 107–118.
Lockwood, P. L., Seara-Cardoso, A., & Viding, E. (2014). Emotion regulation moderates the association between empathy and prosocial behavior.
Lourenço, O. (2014). Domain theory: A critical review. New Ideas in Psychology, 32, 1–17.
Lovett, B. J., & Sheﬃeld, R. A. (2007). Aﬀective empathy deﬁcits in aggressive children and adolescents: A critical review. Clinical Psychology Review, 27(1), 1–13.
Mendez, M. F., Anderson, E., & Shapira, J. S. (2005). An investigation of moral judgement in frontotemporal dementia. Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology, 18(4),
193–197. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/01.wnn.0000191292.17964.bb.
Morris, A. S., Silk, J. S., Steinberg, L., Myers, S. S., & Robinson, L. R. (2007). The role of the family context in the development of emotion regulation. Social
Development, 16(2), 361–388.
Nobes, G., Panagiotaki, G., & Bartholomew, K. J. (2016). The inﬂuence of intention, outcome and question-wording on children’s and adults’ moral judgments.
Cognition, 157, 190–204.
B. Garrigan et al. Developmental Review xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
19
Nobes, G., Panagiotaki, G., & Pawson, C. (2009). The inﬂuence of negligence, intention, and outcome on children’s moral judgments. Journal of Experimental Child
Psychology, 104(4), 382–397.
Nucci, L. P. (2001). Education in the moral domain. Cambridge University Press.
Oostermeijer, S., Nieuwenhuijzen, M., van de Ven, P. M., Popma, A., & Jansen, L. M. C. (2016). Social information processing problems related to reactive and
proactive aggression of adolescents in residential treatment. Personality and Individual Diﬀerences, 90, 54–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.10.035.
Palmer, E. J. (2000). Perceptions of parenting, social cognition and delinquency. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 7(4), 303–309.
Palmer, E. J. (2003). Oﬀending behaviour: Moral reasoning, criminal conduct and the rehabilitation of oﬀenders. Willan Publishing.
Penton-Voak, I. S., Thomas, J., Gage, S. H., McMurran, M., McDonald, S., & Munafò, M. R. (2013). Increasing recognition of happiness in ambiguous facial expressions
reduces anger and aggressive behavior. Psychological Science, 24(5), 688–697. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612459657.
Peterson, C., Slaughter, V., Moore, C., & Wellman, H. M. (2016). Peer social skills and theory of mind in children with autism, deafness, or typical development.
Developmental Psychology, 52(1), 46.
Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of children. London: Routledge & Kegan-Paul.
Powell, N. L., Derbyshire, S. W. G., & Guttentag, R. E. (2012). Biases in children’s and adults’ moral judgments. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 113(1),
186–193. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2012.03.006.
Pozuelos, J. P., Paz-Alonso, P. M., Castillo, A., Fuentes, L. J., & Rueda, M. R. (2014). Development of attention networks and their interactions in childhood.
Developmental Psychology, 50(10), 2405–2415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037469.
Rest, J. R. (1984). The major components of morality. Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development, 24–38.
Rest, J. R., Bebeau, M. J., & Thoma, S. J. (1999). Post conventional moral thinking: A neo-Kohlbergian approach. Psychology Press.
Robinson, L., Spencer, M. D., Thomson, L. D. G., Sprengelmeyer, R., Owens, D. G. C., Stanﬁeld, A. C., ... McKechanie, A. (2012). Facial emotion recognition in Scottish
prisoners. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 35(1), 57–61.
Ross-Sheehy, S., Schneegans, S., & Spencer, J. P. (2015). The infant orienting with attention task: Assessing the neural basis of spatial attention in infancy. Infancy,
20(5), 467–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/infa.12087.
Roth-Hanania, R., Davidov, M., & Zahn-Waxler, C. (2011). Empathy development from 8 to 16 months: Early signs of concern for others. Infant Behavior and
Development, 34(3), 447–458. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2011.04.007.
Rueda, M. R., Rothbart, M. K., McCandliss, B. D., Saccomanno, L., & Posner, M. I. (2005). Training, maturation, and genetic inﬂuences on the development of executive
attention. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102(41), 14931–14936.
Ryan, N. P., Anderson, V., Godfrey, C., Beauchamp, M. H., Coleman, L., Eren, S., ... Catroppa, C. (2014). Predictors of very-long-term sociocognitive function after
pediatric traumatic brain injury: Evidence for the vulnerability of the immature “social brain”. Journal of Neurotrauma, 31(7), 649–657.
Salas, C. E., Castro, O., Yuen, K. S., Radovic, D., d'Avossa, G., & Turnbull, O. H. (2016). ‘Just can't hide it’: A behavioral and lesion study on emotional response
modulation after right prefrontal damage. Social Cognitive and Aﬀective Neuroscience, 11(10), 1528–1540. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsw075.
Scherf, K. S., Sweeney, J. A., & Luna, B. (2006). Brain basis of developmental change in visuospatial working memory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(7),
1045–1058.
Sebastian, Catherine L., Fontaine, Nathalie M. G., Bird, G., Blakemore, S.-J., Brito, De, Stephane, A., ... Viding, E. (2012). Neural processing associated with cognitive
and aﬀective Theory of Mind in adolescents and adults. Social Cognitive and Aﬀective Neuroscience, 7(1), 53–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr023.
Selman, R. L. (1976). Social-cognitive understanding: a guide to educational and clinical practice. In T. Lickona (Ed.). Moral development and behavior: Theory, research
and social issues (pp. 299–317). New York; London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Serrano, J. M., Iglesias, J., & Loeches, A. (1992). Visual discrimination and recognition of facial expressions of anger, fear, and surprise in 4- to 6-month-old infants.
Developmental Psychobiology, 25(6), 411–425.
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Tomer, R., Goldsher, D., Berger, B. D., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2004). Impairment in cognitive and aﬀective empathy in patients with brain lesions:
Anatomical and cognitive correlates. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 26(8), 1113–1127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13803390490515531.
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G. (2011). The neural bases for empathy. The Neuroscientist, 17(1), 18–24.
Smetana, J. G. (2006). Social-cognitive domain theory: Consistencies and variations in children's moral and social judgments. In M. Killen, & J. G. Smetana (Eds.).
Handbook of Moral Development (pp. 119–155). Mahwah, New Jersey London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Smetana, J. G. (1985). Preschool children's conceptions of transgressions: Eﬀects of varying moral and conventional domain-related attributes. Developmental
Psychology, 21(1), 18.
Snarey, J. R. (1985). Cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian research. Psychological Bulletin, 97(2), 202.
Sodian, B., Thoermer, C., & Metz, U. (2007). Now I see it but you don't: 14-month-olds can represent another person's visual perspective. Developmental Science, 10(2),
199–204.
Solomon, M., Buaminger, N., & Rogers, S. J. (2011). Abstract reasoning and friendship in high functioning preadolescents with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 41(1), 32–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10803-010-1017-8.
Somsen, R. J. M. (2007). The development of attention regulation in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. Developmental science, 10(5), 664–680. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00613.x.
Song, M.-J., Smetana, J. G., & Kim, S. Y. (1987). Korean children's conceptions of moral and conventional transgressions. Developmental Psychology, 23(4), 577.
Sprengelmeyer, R., Rausch, Martin, Eysel, Ulf T, & Przuntek, Horst (1998). Neural structures associated with recognition of facial expressions of basic emotions.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 265(1409), 1927–1931.
Steinberg, L. (2007). Risk taking in adolescence: New perspectives from brain and behavioral science. Current directions in psychological science, 16(2), 55–59.
Susac, A., Bubic, A., Vrbanc, A., & Planinic, M. (2014). Development of abstract mathematical reasoning: The case of algebra. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8.
Svetlova, M., Nichols, S. R, & Brownell, C. A. (2010). Toddlers’ prosocial behavior: From instrumental to empathic to altruistic helping. Child Development, 81(6),
1814–1827.
Taber-Thomas, B. C., & Tranel, D. (2012). Social and moral functioning: A cognitive neuroscience perspective. In Vicki Anderson, & Miriam Beauchamp (Eds.).
Developmental social neuroscience and childhood brain insult (pp. 65–91). New York: The Guilford Press.
Tamm, L., Menon, V., & Reiss, A. L. (2002). Maturation of brain function associated with response inhibition. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent
Psychiatry, 41(10), 1231–1238.
Thomas, L. A., De Bellis, M. D., Graham, R., & LaBar, K. S. (2007). Development of emotional facial recognition in late childhood and adolescence. Developmental
science, 10(5), 547–558.
Thompson, R. A. (1994). Emotion regulation: A theme in search of deﬁnition. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 59(2/3), 25–52. http://dx.
doi.org/10.2307/1166137.
Tisak, M. S., & Turiel, E. (1988). Variation in seriousness of transgressions and children's moral and conventional concepts. Developmental Psychology, 24(3), 352.
Tonks, J., Williams, W. H., Frampton, I., Yates, P., & Slater, A. (2007). Reading emotions after child brain injury: A comparison between children with brain injury and
non-injured controls. Brain Injury, 21(7), 731–739. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699050701426899.
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention. Cambridge University Press.
Van Bavel, J. J., FeldmanHall, O., & Mende-Siedlecki, P. (2015). The neuroscience of moral cognition: From dual processes to dynamic systems. Current Opinion in
Psychology, 6, 167–172.
Van der Graaﬀ, J., Branje, S., De Wied, M., Hawk, S., Van Lier, P., & Meeus, W. (2014). Perspective taking and empathic concern in adolescence: Gender diﬀerences in
developmental changes. Developmental Psychology, 50(3), 881.
van Nieuwenhuijzen, M., Vriens, A., Scheepmaker, M., Smit, M., & Porton, E. (2011). The development of a diagnostic instrument to measure social information
processing in children with mild to borderline intellectual disabilities. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 32(1), 358–370. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ridd.
2010.10.012.
Vera-Estay, E., Seni, A. G., Champagne, C., & Beauchamp, M. H. (2016). All for one: Contributions of age, socioeconomic factors, executive functioning, and social
B. Garrigan et al. Developmental Review xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
20
cognition to moral reasoning in childhood. Frontiers in Psychology, 7(227). http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00227.
Vetter, N. C., Altgassen, M., Phillips, L., Mahy, C. E. V., & Kliegel, M. (2013). Development of aﬀective theory of mind across adolescence: Disentangling the role of
executive functions. Developmental Neuropsychology, 38(2), 114–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/87565641.2012.733786.
Walker, L. J. (2002). The model and the measure: An appraisal of the Minnesota approach to moral development. Journal of Moral Education, 31(3), 353–367.
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655–684.
Wikström, P.-O. H, Ceccato, V., Hardie, B., & Treiber, K. (2010). Activity ﬁelds and the dynamics of crime. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26(1), 55–87.
Wikström, P. O. H. (2005). The social origins of pathways in crime: Towards a developmental ecological action theory of crime involvement and its changes. Integrated
developmental and Life-Course Theories of Oﬀending, 14, 211–245.
Wikström, P. O. H, Oberwittler, D., Treiber, K., & Hardie, B. (2012). Breaking rules: The social and situational dynamics of young people's urban crime. OUP Oxford.
Yeates, K. O., Bigler, E. D., Gerhardt, C. A., Rubin, K., Stancin, T., Taylor, H. G., & Vannatta, K. (2012). Theoretical approaches to understanding social function in
childhood brain insults: Toward the integration of social neuroscience and developmental psychology. In V. Anderson, & M. Beauchamp (Eds.). Developmental
social neuroscience and childhood brain insult (pp. 207–231). New York: The Guilford Press.
Ziv, Y., & Sorongon, A. (2011). Social information processing in preschool children: Relations to sociodemographic risk and problem behavior. Journal of experimental
child psychology, 109(4), 412–429. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2011.02.009.
B. Garrigan et al. Developmental Review xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
21
